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The thesis examines and evaluates Feinberg’s theistic defense against the problem of evil
with a view to determining whether it represents a coherent and consistent resolution to the
problem of tragic moral evil. The thesis relies on three criteria for the evaluation: the internal
consistency of Feinberg’s theistic defense, its exegetical accuracy, and epistemic adequacy.
Chapter 1 states the statement of purpose and position of the thesis, as well as, the limitations
and the methodology of the study. This chapter introduces the basis of our evaluation.
Chapter 2 provides a theological and philosophical review of the literature on the
problem of evil. The chapter defines the concept of evil and explains multidimensionality of the
problem of evil: the logical problem, the evidential problem, and the religious problem. It also
explores the concepts of free will, moral responsibility, and soft determinism from a
compatibilist’s perspective, and highlights the various arguments for and against compatibilism,
including such arguments as Consequence Argument and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
(PAP). The chapter then presents a general overview of how contemporary Modified
Rationalists see the problem of evil.
Chapter 3 highlights Feinberg’s theodicy (or defense, as he prefers to call it),
underscoring his theological belief as a moderate Calvinist with compatibilistic metaphysics and

his theistic system as a Calvinistic version of Modified Rationalism with a non-consequential
ethic. The chapter then highlights Feinberg’s defense against the logical problem of evil as the
background to his theistic defense against the evidential problem of tragic moral evil. The
chapter further highlights Feinberg’s arguments against the evidence from evil by focusing on
his arguments against induction and probability as well as on the limitation of human knowledge,
the problems of gratuitous evil, and quantity of evil.
Chapter 4 evaluates John Feinberg’s theodicy on tragic moral evil on the basis of its
internal consistency, exegetical accuracy and epistemic adequacy. The chapter affirms the
internal consistency of Feinberg’s theistic defense against the problem of evil, but reveals some
theological disagreements by this author with Feinberg on the exegetical accuracy of his theistic
defense against the problem of tragic moral evil. Such disagreements center on what kind of
man God intended to create and whether He created man with a non-glorified body in a morally
imperfect state. The chapter affirms the epistemic adequacy of Feinberg’s theistic defense
against the atheologian arguments from evil.
Chapter 5 summarizes the materials of the first four chapters and presents the conclusion
of the thesis: that the existence of evil does not negate in any way the omnipotence, omniscience,
or omnibenevolence of God; neither does it make God to be malevolent nor impotent. Rather,
the existence of evil is a logical and necessary outcome of the doctrines of God’s sovereignty and
human freedom, the transcendence, and the righteousness of God. The chapter demonstrates that
the existence of evil and its manifestation in pain and suffering has a purpose in the divine
economy and that human beings can experience justice only by developing personal and intimate
relationships with God. The chapter further argues that rather than hold God responsible for the
effects of evil, the culpability should be laid at the doorsteps of moral agents (humans and Satan)
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and that no matter how much Satan tries, he cannot negate the eternal plan of God for the
salvation and redemption of humanity, which God already sealed with the atoning death of His
only begotten Son, Jesus Christ. Finally, the chapter encourages humankind to pursue a loving
relationship with God. It is by so doing that they can be able to overcome evil with good and
have hope of blissful existence in the new world to come.
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INTRODUCTION
Many of us have struggled to come to terms with horrendous and tragic evils that
happened to someone we know or even ourselves. It is a well-known fact that Job, whom God
called “blameless and upright,”1 suffered the most tragic evil resulting in complete destruction of
all his life possessions including his children for no apparent just cause. Even when God
decided to answer Job and his friends, He never explained why Job had to suffer such
devastations but rather overwhelmed him with His sovereignty. Although God restored
everything Job lost two-fold, the restoration rarely explained the justification for the tragic and
moral evils that he had to endure neither did it portray God as the omniscient, omnipotent, and
omnibenevolent God.
In the same manner, how does one comfort a mother whose child has just been raped and
killed or the families of the victims of a school shooting that left many children dead? How does
one justify a terrorist attack like the one witnessed in this country on September 11, 2001 or the
kind of genocide visited on the Tutsis by Hutu power groups in Rwanda in 1994? Is there any
justification for the atrocious moral evils that are being witnessed on a daily basis worldwide?
Where is God in all these? Is the notion of God as the omniscient, omnipotent, and
omnibenevolent Being compatible with the existence of evil?
Many scholars since Epicurus, theists and non-theists alike, have focused on the problem
of evil. However, the jury is still out on how effective these attempts have been in answering or
rebutting in particular the evidential problems of evil. It is generally acknowledged that the
problem of evil comes in at least three forms: the logical problem, the evidential problem, and
the existential or religious problem. While there is a consensus among scholars that the logical
1

Job 1:8, NIV

1

problem of evil which deals with the logical compatibility of God with the existence of evil has
been mostly resolved since Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, the evidential problem of evil
which has to do with the ubiquitousness of horrendous evil as probable evidence against God’s
existence has been more problematic to resolve. There are several contemporary approaches to
the resolution of evidential problem of evil. Such approaches include the compatibilist or
modern Calvinistic perspectives that seek to establish the compatibility of free will and moral
responsibility with soft determinism. A major proponent of the Calvinistic approach to the
resolution of the evidential problem of evil is John Feinberg. Feinberg, in his book The Many
Faces of Evil, has extensively analyzed the evidential problem of evil and advanced a robust
approach to resolving the problem of moral evil. However, is John Feinberg’s theodicy a
coherent and consistent solution to the problem of tragic moral evil? This is a question we
intend to explore and answer.

Statement of Purpose of the Thesis
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate John Feinberg’s theodicy with
a view to determining whether it represents a coherent and consistent resolution to the evidential
problem of tragic moral evil. The horrendousness and preponderance of tragic moral evil has
provided ammunition for atheists like William Rowe to postulate that the all-knowing, allpowerful, and all-good God of Christianity could not exist in the face of such horrendous evil
like the Auschwitz genocide, especially when there was no perceivable good for the victims of
such evil.2

2

William Rowe, “An Exchange on the Problem of Evil” in God and the Problem of Evil, edited by William
Rowe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001): 130. See also Rowe, William. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of
Atheism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-341.
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The evidential problem of evil has proven to be extremely knotty and difficult to resolve
mainly because of the inability of many theodicies to explain or justify the existence of an allpowerful, all-knowing, and all-loving God in the face of ubiquitous horrific moral evils. Any
credible attempt at resolving the problem of tragic moral evil must be seen to have provided
reasonable and probable answers to the following questions. Could God not have accomplished
His divine purpose without recourse to such horrendous evils as holocausts, mass genocides, and
torture? Are there any divine goals or futuristic goods that can justify the horrendous evils that
are prevalent in the world? How about the unfairness in the distribution of evil, especially the
gratuitous type like the one suffered by Job?
This thesis shall examine and evaluate Feinberg’s theodicy on the basis of its internal
consistency, exegetical accuracy, and epistemic adequacy in order to determine if it is a coherent
resolution to the problem of tragic moral evil. We shall do this after reviewing the literature on
modern Calvinistic approach to the evidential problem of evil, especially in terms of
compatibilists’ arguments on free will, moral responsibility, and determinism. This is necessary
because Feinberg is a Calvinist. We therefore need to highlight the basis of his theological belief
and theistic system. However, what is the significance of this thesis in the face of the common
knowledge about the problem of moral evil?
Perhaps, the main significance of this thesis is found in the very heart of Christian belief
in the existence of a loving and righteous God who is not only all knowing, but also infinitely
powerful and all loving. While the atheists have conceded the rationality of theistic arguments
for compatibility of the existence of God with the logical problem of evil, the same is not true for
the evidential problem of evil due to the prevalence and the extent of gratuitous moral evil,
which, according to them, makes it highly improbable that God exists. Therefore, it is important
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for theists to be able to explain the basis of their beliefs in a coherent manner not only to
demonstrate the probable existence of God even in the face of horrendous evils, but also to
provide a cogent Christian apologetic that can possibly counteract the arguments of competing
worldviews.3
Another dimension to the importance of this study is the opportunity it affords us to
analyze and evaluate Feinberg’s defense against the problem of tragic moral evil. In his book,
The Many Faces of Evil, Feinberg analyzes and evaluates many theological systems and
theodicies, including Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, on the basis of which he postulates what one
can regard as a reasonable theistic defense against tragic moral evil. However, does it stack up
to a consistent and coherent theodicy? Can we use it as a model of Calvinistic compabilistic
perspective on moral tragic evil? Will one then be right to claim that Feinberg has postulated a
coherent resolution to the problem of tragic moral evil? These are some of the questions, which
this thesis shall endeavor to answer.

Statement of Thesis Position
John Feinberg’s theodicy on the evidential problem of tragic moral evil is predicated on
Calvinistic compatibilism or soft determinism, which assumes that whatever happens in the
universe has been decreed to be so by God from eternal past for the sole purpose of fulfilling His
divine purpose. Since nothing, including the exercise of free will by man can affect God’s
ability to achieve His goals and purposes, every instance of evil should be seen as necessary for
the attainment of those goals. Also, since it requires an omniscient mind, which unfortunately
human beings do not possess, to demonstrate that any evil experienced in the world is
unnecessary for the actualization of God’s divine purpose, it is impossible to disprove the
3

I Pet. 3:15
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validity of the claim that God’s goals and purposes demand the existence of some particular evil
which can then be seen as morally justifiable.
While it might be true that human beings are incapable of fully understanding the mind of
God, it appears expedient to assess Feinberg’s theodicy in order to determine whether there is the
possibility of a direct correlation between the attainment of God’s purpose and occurrence of
tragic moral evil. From Feinberg’s arguments, it would appear that a world without evil is less
desirable. However, could God have accomplished His purpose without evil? Can one consider
such divine purposes, which necessitate so much evil as being morally justifiable? In responding
to Feinberg, Clark Pinnock strongly disagrees4 with this claim and sees a fundamental flaw in
theological determinism, which, like the concepts of predestination and fatalism, ignores the
exercise of free will in opposition to God’s choice and also negates the experience of conversion,
creating the impression that an individual exercises no choice in the act of conversion. The
implication of Pinnock’s argument is that if man can exercise his free will in a way that is not
according to the perfect will of God, even to the extent of having capacity to resist the act of
conversion, evil cannot and should not be seen as God ordained but as human acts emanating
from free will.
However the position of this thesis is that while Feinberg’s theodicy might have some
problems in attempting to provide a coherent argument against the evidential problem of tragic
moral evil, it is clearly an attempt in the right direction in that it contributes to the resolution to
the problem of tragic moral evil, and can therefore with qualifications be regarded as a coherent
and probable theodicy. The thesis shall therefore affirm Feinberg’s theodicy as a probable
justification for theism even in the face of the evidential problem of moral evil.
4

Clark Pinnock, "Clark Pinnock’s Response to John Feinberg" in Predestination and Free Will: Four
Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, edited by David Basinger and Randall Basinger, 57-60.
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press 1986).
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Limitations of the Study
The thesis is limited in the following ways. First, it is limited in focus to the problem of
tragic moral evil. The problem of natural evil is beyond the scope of this study. Second, it is
limited in focus to the evidential problem of tragic moral evil. Any mention of logical and
existential problems of evil will only be in passing, to the extent that it will support our review
and evaluation of the evidential problem.5 Third, it is limited in terms of scope to the
contemporary views of free will, which is further constrained by particular focus on the
Calvinistic compatibilistic perspectives. Finally, it is specifically focused on John Feinberg’s
theodicy on evidential problem of tragic moral evil. Although this is an evaluation of Feinberg’s
theodicy, we shall also consider other theological perspectives that will enhance our discussion
and evaluation.

Methodology of the Study
The major focus of this thesis is to answer the research questions concerning whether
John Feinberg’s theodicy on tragic moral evil provides a coherent resolution to the problem of
evil. In doing this, we shall review the relevant literature on the problem of tragic moral evil
with particular emphasis on theological and philosophical perspectives of modern Calvinism on
the issue. We shall also review and analyze the body of literature on Modified Rationalism and
Compatibilism. This is because Feinberg is a Modified Rationalist with a compatibilistic
metaphysic and non-consequential ethic.
Compatibilism, which is based on the notion that human freedom and determinism are
compatible with one another, comes in many faces. However, this thesis shall concentrate on
three major areas: the causal determinism and consequence argument, semi-compatibilism and
5

All these and other terminologies will be defined the next chapter.
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the Frankfurt-type examples, and responsibility and Frankfurt-type examples. The aim is not
only to review the literature that formed the basis of John Feinberg’s theodicy but also to analyze
it so that we can clearly understand Feinberg’s thought process in the development of his
theodicy on tragic moral evils, and thereby evaluate his theistic defense against the problem of
evil. We will pay particular attention to how the issue of logical compatibility of free will and
soft determinism is resolved and how human responsibility for moral agency actions can be
incorporated into such determinism.
On the basis of the literature review, we will be able to analyze and evaluate John
Feinberg’s theodicy on tragic moral evil and to decide consequently whether he has advanced a
coherent theodicy that is logical, rational, and probable in order to resolve the evidential problem
of moral evil. The final analysis and evaluation of John Feinberg’s theodicy on tragic moral evil
shall be done mainly on the basis of the following criteria.
First, it will be evaluated on the basis of internal consistency by which we mean how
Feinberg’s conclusions correlate essentially with concepts of God’s sovereignty and moral
agency, especially on the issues of responsibility and culpability for moral agency actions. The
aim is to determine the level of logical coherency inherent in his theistic defense, which is based
on Calvinistic compatibilism, modified rationalism, and non-consequentialism. This approach,
which is based on the internal structure and foundation of the theodicy, affords Feinberg to speak
for himself without this author having to rely on external sources to conclude whether he has
postulated a coherent theodicy of tragic moral evil. However, having said that, this does not
necessarily mean that any relevant external source that can help with the evaluation will be
ignored.
Second, it will be evaluated on the basis of exegetical accuracy, which seeks to evaluate
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how theologically plausible Feinberg’s theodicy is, especially its fitness with various biblical
passages that deal with the essence of God. On the basis of Feinberg’s conclusions, can tragic
moral evil be justified, and if so, will believers and non-believers see the utility of Feinberg’s
theodicy in the face of horrendous evil?
Third, it will be evaluated on the basis of its epistemic adequacy. Obviously, for
Feinberg’s theistic defense against evil as evidence to succeed, it must be seen to discredit
somehow atheistic propositions that are essentially based on inductive and probabilistic
arguments. We shall therefore examine Feinberg’s defensive arguments and analyze the nature
of induction and probability, as well as evaluate the epistemological and existential implications
of Feinberg’s offensive strategy against atheistic argument from evil with a view to confirming
their adequacy.
On the basis of the outcome of the evaluation, we shall conclude that Feinberg’s theistic
defense is an internally consistent and coherent resolution of the evidential problem of evil. We
shall them endeavor to speak to the eschatological dispensation of a futuristic and morally
perfect world, an expected outcome of the atoning work of Christ for humanity. A final biblical
exegesis of two passages (Gen. 3:15 and I King 18:24-40) will be expounded to highlight the fact
that although we have to live in this fallen world, God will ultimately work things out for His
children and that adversity can only make believers stronger and better prepared for the glory
ahead.

8

CHAPTER 2
PROBLEM OF EVIL: A THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSPHICAL REVIEW
Evil: Definition of Terms
Evil can be defined as the antithesis of good with the intentional effect of precipitating
destruction and harm, and is perceived to be morally objectionable, distasteful and/or malefic.
Merriam-Webster dictionary describes evil as the fact of suffering, misfortune, and wrongdoing;
a cosmic evil force, and as something that brings sorrow, distress or calamity. 6 Simply put, evil
is that which is not good. Benedict de Spinoza states that good and evil are two sides of the
same coin and that the difference between the two of them has to do with mere personal
preferences, so that “… everyone, by the highest right of Nature, judges what is good and what is
evil, considers his own advantage according to his own temperament....7 Carl Jung defines evil as
the “dark side of God” and regards the incarnation of Jesus Christ as God coming to terms with
His own shadow.8
Evil has two main distinctions: the moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil is a
wrongdoing or harm caused by some agents while natural evil is harm perpetrated by agentless
causes such as natural disasters and diseases. Having defined evil, we can know look at the
various dimensions of the problem of evil.

Multidimensionality of the Problem of Evil
In philosophical and theological discourse, it is common to talk of the problem of evil as
if evil is homogeneous and that there is only one problem associated with it. In common

6

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/evil
Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, translated by Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics, 2005, 135
8
Stephen Palmquist, Dreams of Wholeness: A course of Introductory Lectures on Religion, Psychology
and Personal Growth (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 1997/2008), see especially Chapter XI.
7
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parlance, the problem of evil has been formulated in terms of the compatibility of the existence
of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving God with the existence of evil, especially the
horrendous and gratuitous ones. However, as Feinberg mentions several times in The Many
Faces of Evil, there is no one problem of evil. Evil, according to him, is multidimensional or
multifaceted, and it will therefore be difficult, if not totally impossible, to evaluate a theistic
system’s theodicy without understanding what kind of the problem of evil it is designed to
resolve. Commenting on atheistic objections to Plantinga’s free will defense, Feinberg writes:
There is also an important implication for the atheist of the fact that there isn’t just one
problem of evil. It is illegitimate to reject a theist’s defense against one problem of evil
on the ground that it doesn’t solve all problems of evil. Unfortunately, atheists frequently
make that mistake.9
Thus, flowing from Feinberg’s assertions, it is most unlikely that one particular form of theistic
system or theodicy can fully resolve all problems of evil. According to him, “It is wrongheaded
at a very fundamental level to think that because a given defense or theodicy doesn’t solve every
problem of evil, it doesn’t solve any problem of evil.”10 From this, it is evident that in other to
evaluate Feinberg’s theistic defense against evil, one must recognize to which of the dimensions
of evil his defense applies.
While there are potentially many problems of evil, we have determined to focus on three
broad categorizations of the problems of evil: the logical problem, the evidential problem and the
religious problem. In looking at the logical problem, we shall pose the question in terms of
rationality of theism; the evidential problem, on the other hand, shall be examined in terms of the
probability of theism given evidential arguments from evil, while discussion on religious
problem of evil shall center on livability of theism.

9

John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and The Problem of Evil Revised and
expanded ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), 26.
10
Ibid., 27.
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The Logical Problem of Evil: Rationality of Theism
The main focus of the logical problem is to determine the rationality of any theistic
system, which seeks to explain the compatibility of God with evil. For many centuries, the
fundamental approach to philosophical/theological discussions of the problem of evil had
centered on the logical problem of evil. However, in more recent time the focus has shifted
more to evidential and religious problems of evil. Simply put, the logical problem claims that
the insistence by theists on the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God
in the face of the existence of evil is unreasonable: that the existence of evil basically negates the
existence of such a God.
One of the most prominent proponents of the logical problem was David Hume who, in
his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, asks “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and
willing? Whence then is evil.11 J. L. Mackie concludes that “religious beliefs lack rational
support,” and are contradictory, and only sustainable “by a much more extreme rejection of
reason.”12 Such atheists believe that the traditional formulation of the problem of evil has dealt
a fatal blow to theism, thus the apparent confidence of Mackie and others like him in declaring
that theism has no basis in the face of evil. Does the existence of evil logically invalidate the
classical Christian theism?
In rejecting Mackie’s and other atheists’ argument that the existence of evil is
inconsistent with theism, Feinberg declares that the atheists err at least in two ways: their

11

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: The Posthumous Essays of the Immortality of the
Soul and of Suicide (Parts X) 2nd edition, edited by Richard Pokin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), 63.
12
J L Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” in Basil Mitchell, ed., Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 92.
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erroneous assertion that “all forms of theism” believe that an all-powerful God is able to remove
“all forms of evil,” and that their concepts of evil correspond to every theist’s idea of evil.13
According to him, the only way God can eliminate all evil is to redefine omnipotence to include
the possibility of actualizing “logically contradictory states of affairs.”14 However, that is not
how God’s power is defined in many theistic systems. Many theistic systems believe that God
can only actualize states of affairs that are logically non-contradictory. For example, God cannot
create a round-square hole or a married bachelor. In addition, Feinberg believes that the notion
of the problem of evil is ambiguous since there are many problems of evil corresponding to the
plurality of theistic systems with each requiring a different resolution. Thus, an argument that
successfully solves the problem of evil in one theological system may not be able to solve the
same problem in another theological system. Similarly an argument designed to resolve the
logical problem of evil might prove to be inadequate for the resolution of a religious problem of
evil. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect a particular theistic system to solve a problem of evil
that it is not designed to solve in the first instance. However, if that system is logically coherent
and consistent enough to solve the problem of evil that it is designed to solve, then one cannot
query its rationality.
As explained above, the logical problem of evil is a philosophical/theological discourse,
which can only be assessed on the basis of the internal consistency of that theistic system with its
particular metaphysical and ethical assumptions. Calling this the “ground rule” for handling
logical problem of evil, Feinberg asserts that the theist must formulate a theistic system that is
consistent and supportive of its theological beliefs, while the atheist, in order to declare the
system illogical and/or irrational, “must specify a problem that actually arises within the views of

13
14

Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil, 18-19.
Ibid., 18.
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the system they attack.”15 A particular system cannot be invalidated just because one does not
accept the premises of the system’s metaphysical and ethical beliefs. Such a disagreement is
external to the system, which does not make it irrational.

For example, while Feinberg

considers the metaphysical and ethical bases of Theonomy deficient, he nevertheless believes
that it is rational, logical, consistent, and coherent in its resolution to the logical problem of evil
it poses.16 Similarly, while he considers Plantinga’s libertarian and incompatibilistic view of
human freedom as too expansive and also sees Leibniz’s God as revolting, he nevertheless
concedes that both theistic systems logically resolved their own problems of evil, and they are
therefore internally consistent with their metaphysics and ethics.17
Although, Feinberg’s elaborate repudiation of Mackie’s and other atheists’ views on
compatibility of the theists’ God with evil has been documented above, most credit however, for
the resolution of the logical problem of evil, goes to Alvin Plantinga who, in his God, Freedom,
and Evil, masterfully offered “The Free Will Defense” on the basis of which both the atheists
and theists congruently came to the realization that the logical problem of evil is resolvable. He
argues that the inability of a theist to know the actual reason(s) why God allows evil does not
invalidate his system, or that “he is irrational in thinking that God does indeed have a reason.”18
Rather, the ball is in the court of the atheist to prove that it is unreasonable for anyone to assume
that God has His reason(s) for allowing evil. Using logic, induction, and probabilistic deduction,
Plantinga is able to demonstrate that it is logically impossible for God to have created
“significantly free creatures” without thereby effecting or allowing moral evil.19 He then
concludes his defense of theism by stating that:
15

Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 27.
Ibid., 43-44.
17
Ibid., 121-122, 62-66.
18
Alvin J. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1974), 11.
19
Ibid., 55.
16
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The upshot, I believe, is that there is no good atheological argument from evil. The
existence of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence of evil.
Of course, suffering and misfortune may nonetheless constitute a problem for the theist;
but the problem is not that his beliefs are logically or probabilistically incompatible…
But this is a problem of a different dimension. Such a problem calls, not for
philosophical enlightenment, but for pastoral care. The Free Will Defense, however,
shows that the existence of God is compatible, both logically and probabilistically, with
the existence of evil; thus it solves the main philosophical problem of evil.
As a result of the cogency of Plantinga, there developed a general consensus among theists and
atheists that the theists’ God is compatible with the existence of evil. Mackie for example, in a
posthumous work, finally concedes the rationality and logicality of theists’ belief in an
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, even in the face of the evil in the world we
dwell in.20 Similarly, William L. Rowe, another atheist, while responding to Plantinga
acknowledges that “there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is
logically consistent of the theistic God.”21 We will now turn to the evidential problem of evil.

The Evidential Problem: Probability of Theism
The main focus of evidential problem of evil has to do with the probability of theism,
given the existence of evil in the world. Specifically the evidential problem of evil asks the
question: how probable is the existence of the theistic God in the face of ubiquitous evil? As a
result of Plantinga’s successful defense of free will and efforts by other theologians and
philosophers, many “atheologians”22 have conceded that the theistic belief in the existence of an
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God after all is not rendered irrational by the
existence of evil. However the concession of the atheologians does not necessarily make the

20

J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 154.
William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” American Philosophical
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (October 1979): 335.
22
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theologians’ arguments credible. In the words of Feinberg, “It only shows that there are many
theists who can tell a logically consistent story when they talk about God and evil.”23 Thus,
while many atheologians no longer believe that evil necessarily makes belief in God irrational,
nevertheless, most do believe that the very existence of evil provides strong evidence for the
improbability of theism. However, before we get into these debates between atheologians and
theologians, let us consider the forms of the evidential problem of evil.
The evidential problem of evil can be formulated in inductive, probabilistic, or evidential
forms.24 According to Feinberg, induction, in its classical form, amounts to “generalization”
from “repeatedly observed phenomenon” or occurrences that allow one to conclude that ceteris
paribus the phenomenon or instance will continue with the same pattern in the future.25
However in terms of the inductive problem of evil, the argument tends to be formulated in terms
of the correctness of the theists’ hypothesis that the existence of evil does not constitute probable
evidence against theism. This is usually formulated in terms of a hypothesis (H), an assumption
(A), and a factual datum (D) so that if H is true, assuming A is true, then D will be true. Now in
a situation where D obtains (i.e. D is the case), then one can conclude that H is probably true.26
However, Plantinga, in discrediting the utility of such inductive reasoning, argues that
unless one is in possession of all the relevant information about a particular evidential issue and
able to quantify it mathematically, it is probably useless to make an inductive or probabilistic
pronouncement about it.27 Also, since the inductive argument from evil relies on probability
theory, the Bayes Theorem to be specific, Plantinga shows the difficulties inherent in
determining the a priori probability that God exists given the existence of evil and the
23
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probabilities of the other elements of the Bayes Theorem, without one being subjective. He then
argues that unless the atheologians and theologians are able to agree on the a priori and a
posteriori probabilities of the existence of God given the existence of evil, the atheologian
evidence from evil is suspect and subjective. 28
In terms of atheological evidentialism, the problem of evil is usually reduced to the
outrageously high number and intensity of evil occurring in the world, its apparent senselessness
or gratuitousness, and its enormity. William Rowe for instance in presenting his case from evil
against God’s existence argues strongly that on the basis of the quantity, intensity, and
gratuitousness of preventable evil, there is a high level of probability that the atheists are right
after all in their opposition to theism.29 He argues that if God existed he would have prevented
the atrocities of Auschwitz since there were no perceivable and justifiable reasons for allowing
the evil of such magnitude: the fact that Auschwitz happened was evidence against God’s
existence. Rowe's arguments from evil generated a lot of back and forth discussions between
him and a number of theists including Plantinga and Wkysstra, to mention just a few.30
Although Mackie does not clearly postulate an evidential problem, he, nevertheless,
argues that given the quantity and gratuitousness of evil, it is less probable that God exists.
Mackie’s argument is predicated on the notion of “unabsorbed” (surplus) evil, his rejection of the
notion of “causal laws,” which he says God supposedly transcends (since he made the causal
laws, he should be above them), as well as what he terms “parasitic” second-order goods (goods
arising from first-order evil) and third-order goods (goods arising from second-order evil). He
28
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concludes that an omnipotent and loving God “does not need to use deplorable means to achieve
his ends.”31
Daniel Snyder, an atheist whose major purpose is to strengthen Rowe’s arguments,
introduces the concept of “preventable surplus evil,” which he defines as an evil whose
“disvalue” is greater than any possible values it may have. Contrary to Rowe’s argument that
preventable gratuitous evil is evidence against God’s existence, Snyder concedes to the theists
the compatibility of preventable gratuitous evil with theism, but argues that what constitutes
credible evidence against theism is preventable surplus evil. Using the example of a serial killer,
Snyder explains that while the first five murders by the serial killer can have higher utility value
in terms of the killer’s character formation and development, the utilities of his sixth and seventh
murders are so diminished that they constitute a disvalue to his character formation. Snyder,
therefore, argues that if there is an all-powerful and all-loving God, he will eliminate any surplus
unnecessary evil that exists. Since such surplus evils exist, he concludes, there cannot be such a
God.32
Michael Martin, an evidentialist, argues from evil against God, believing that the
existence of evil in large quantity constitutes a prima facie case against the existence of God. He
argues that since an all-powerful and all-loving God would have eliminated evil in its abundance
unless they are logically necessary or there are cogent reasons to allow them, the very existence
of evil in abundance without its logical necessity or tenable reasons for allowing it provides a
prima facie evidence against God.33
Obviously the evidential argument from evil calls for critical response by theists. We
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have already highlighted Plantinga’s strong criticism of the inductive and probabilistic
arguments from the existence of evil as evidence against theism. Having established the
subjectivity of Bayes Theorem as applied to the evidential problem of evil, and given the
unavailability of sufficient knowledge about why God allows evil or whether there is too much
evil, Plantinga argues that it is fallacious for the atheologians to label theists’ opinion as
“noetically below par.”34 According to him:
For what it shows is that this atheological program is totally misconceived. If prior
probabilities are thus relative to noetic structures, it is no wonder that theist and
atheologians will assign different values to P(G) and P(E); and hence is no more than a
bit of intellectual imperialism for the atheologians to insist that the theist accept the
atheological estimate of P(G/E).35
In his own argument for theism, Richard Swinburne attempts to calculate the prior (or
intrinsic, as he calls it) and posterior probabilities of theism and atheism utilizing Bayes
Theorem which, he says, depends more on the simplicity of the proposition or hypothesis than
anything else. Since theism, according to him, implies more simplicity than atheism – based on
the notion of God as an omnipotent, timeless, and endless necessary Being – the probability of
theism is much higher than the atheistic system. That said, Swinburne exonerates God saying
that as a “supreme” Being, God will never violate His moral purity. He then concludes that an
incompatibilistically free man needs the knowledge of good and evil in order to decide rationally
whether to actualize evil or prevent it. As to the quantity of evil in the world which is an integral
argument of the atheists from evil, Swinburne argues that to seek for a reduced amount of evil is
to deny mankind the needed learning curves and opportunities; stating that:
What in effect the objection is asking is that a God should make a toy-world, a world
where things matter, but not very much; where we can choose and our choices can make
small difference, but the real choices remain God’s. For he simply would not allow us
the choice of doing real harm, or through our negligence allowing real harm to occur. He
34
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would be like the over-protective parent who will not let his child out of sight for a
moment.36
Responding to the atheistic argument from evil, Bruce Reichenbach presents four
arguments to refute the atheologian conclusions about evil being evidence against God. First, he
argues that if the theists and atheists had access to complete body of evidence about theism,
rather than just the background information, the a priori probability of theism would have been
higher than one half.37 Second, since there is no unanimity between theist and atheist on what
constitutes the evidence and the value to assign to it, it is practically impossible to assign a priori
probability without subjective biases.38 Thirdly, he argues that if God did not exist the quantity
of evil in the world would have been much greater than it is currently.39 Finally, he argues that
since the atheologians cannot prove that it is possible for God to eradicate all the evil He can
without eliminating a greater good or actualizing a greater evil, then the most reasonable option
is to be agnostic without tipping one’s hand one way or the other by expressing one’s belief for
or against theism.40 Reichenbach, based on the above arguments, then concludes that:
In conclusion, it seems that the atheologian is no more successful with his evidential or
inductive argument than with his deductive one. His inductive argument from evil does
not disconfirm God’s existence, nor has he presented relevant evidence to show that evil
tends to disconfirm God’s existence. Nor do the prospects appear bright that he can
produce the relevant evidence. Thus it remains to be shown that the existence and
profusion of evil makes it irrational to believe in the existence of an omnipotent,
omniscient, good and loving personal God.41
How relevant to Feinberg, a compatibilist, are the arguments against evil from incompatibilists
such as Plantinga, Swimburne, and Reichenbach? The arguments are relevant because they have
nothing to do with the notion of free will – whether compatibilistic or incompatibilistic. These
36
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are general arguments against evil, which are relevant irrespective of one’s view of free will.
Perhaps for this reason Feinberg incorporates most of those arguments into his defense against
the problem of evil. For example, it would appear that Feinberg fully adopted Plantinga’s strong
criticism of the inductive and probabilistic arguments from evil, and somehow agreed with
Swimburne and Reichenbach about the difficulty of calculating the a priori and a posteriori
probabilities of theism, as well as the inability of man to access the complete body of evidence
about theism. We will now turn to the so-called “religious problem of evil.”

The Religious Problem: Livability of Theism
The so-called “religious problem of evil” seeks to answer the question about whether
theism is livable in the world we live in. Often believers who have suffered losses and/or
deprivation have experienced moments when they wondered whether the Christian God is who
they think He is, and, if He exists, is worthy of their adoration and worship after all. The
religious problem of evil brings the problem of evil existentially closer to home at individual
levels, rather than the comparatively abstractive theological/philosophical problem, which both
the logical and evidential problems of evil entail. Writing on this, William Bruce Ostrom states:
“In the pitch dark of pain, the Christian may wrestle with some of his beliefs about God, even
contemplating some of the theoretical issues, but the more important concern is how his
understanding of God’s relationship to suffering affects his ability to love and trust God.”42
Plantinga, defining the nature of religious problem of evil, declares:
The theist may find a religious problem in evil; in the presence of his own suffering or
that of someone near to him he may find it difficult to maintain what he takes to be the
proper attitude towards God. Faced with great personal suffering or misfortune, he may
be tempted to rebel against God, to shake his fist in God’s face, or even to give up belief
42
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in God altogether…. Such a problem calls, not for philosophical enlightenment, but for
pastoral care. 43
As stated by Plantinga, the religious problem of evil is a unique form of the problem of evil,
which cannot be resolved merely through philosophical arguments. What a person going
through such a problem needs is empathy and counsel from his religious mentor and those who
love him. However, that is not to say that rational reflection is not required. Rather, as Feinberg
points out, intellectual response has to be tempered with care giving and wisdom.44
Perhaps, the one that most clearly illustrate the problem of religious evil is Job, an
upright man even by God’s standards, who was greatly afflicted but maintained his integrity.
Even after his wife had asked him to curse God and die and his friends had disparaged him, he
remained reasonably resolute in his hope and trust in God; saying: “Though he slay me, yet will I
trust in him….” (Job 13:15, KJV) Job by his hope in God shows believers how to handle
afflictions, even those that are as devastating as the ones he suffered.

The Concept of Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Soft Determinism: A Compatilbilist’s
Perspective
The most popular defense of theism against the problem posed by the existence of evil is
the free will defense. The free will defense usually incorporates an incompatiblist metaphysic,
which in essence postulates a dichotomy between free will and any form of determinism. Simply
put, incompatibilists see determinism and free will opposed to each other with the one negating
the other. Thus for man to be free in a libertarian sense, one has to reject the possibility of causal
determinism. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines free will as “voluntary choice or decision,”
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and as the “freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by
divine intervention.”45 This is the libertarian definition of free will.
On the other hand, the compatibilists (soft determinism) believe that human freedom
(free will) and determinism are not mutually exclusive, but are rather compatible with one
another. Compatibilism simply says that free will is compatible with soft determinism.
However the notion of free will in the compatibilist sense is different from that reflected by
incompatibilism. While libertarian free will implies freedom that is unconstrained by human
disposition and predetermination by God, the compatibilists’ notion of free will incorporates
freedom that is unconstrained, but recognizes God’s sovereignty. In other words, according to
the compatibilists, man chooses only what God has predetermined. However for as long as that
choice is made without constraint, the person choosing is said to be free in the compatibilist way.
Compatibilists believe that the free will defense is problematic for its libertarian view of free will
and for ascribing a first order value to freedom. Free will should however be understood as a
sovereign God’s prerogative which, even after it has been given, still ensures God’s sovereignty
over the affairs of men. For this reason the compatibilists argue that compatibilism is the right
view of free will, and God, as the first cause, is able to ensure that man always freely choose
good over evil.46 Perhaps this is what happens when a truly redeemed man consistently and
freely choose to do what is right most of the time.
From the above, it is obvious that one’s understanding of the notion of free will depends
on one’s theological and metaphysical viewpoint, whether from the libertarian perspective or
45
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from the compatibilist point of view. As we shall see later, Feinberg is a compatibilist.
Therefore his concept of free will is based on a form of compatibilist free will. According to
Feinberg, for most compatibilists “an act is free if it is determined by causes which decisively
incline the will without constraining it, i.e., without moving it to choose and the agent to act
against the agent’s wishes.”47
Furthermore, because moral responsibility is decisively linked to the notion of freedom,
compatibilism can be expressed in terms of “compatibility between moral responsibility and soft
determinism.” The argument is that for a human agent to be culpable or morally responsible for
his actions, he must be able to take those actions under his own volition without coercions or
constraints. A necessary ingredient for true moral responsibility is the unrestricted ability to
have full control over one’s conducts or behavior.48 Thus in order to hold someone accountable
or responsible for his/her action, he/she must not only be in control but must be seen to be in
control of the action at all possible point in time of the action.
Finally, determinism can be defined as “the doctrine that the nonrelational facts of the
past and the laws of nature entail one unique future.”49 In other words, determinism implies
necessary causation by “antecedent events,” so that facts of the past coupled with natural law
effects produce the future events. The implication is that, ceteris paribus, and given the past and
assuming the laws of nature to be invariant, one can rightly expect a unique possible future for
any particular moment of time.
Determinism is said to pose, at least, two distinct threats to free will in the libertarian
sense. First, it is argued that free will requires the availability of alternate possibilities, by which
47
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is meant that the person carrying out the act or action should possess genuine freedom to choose
a particular action from various possible alternatives or to have chosen otherwise. However
causal determinism preempts such possibilities. Second, it is also argued that determinism
prevents the possibility of “authentic agency,” by which is meant that a moral agent can only be
held responsible for his action “if the antecedent actional elements, like her values, desires, or
beliefs that cause that behavior, are “truly her own”; they are not, for example, the product of
direct, surreptitious implantation.”50 Since under hard determinism human behavior is wholly
attributable to causation arising from past events, some even before one’s birth, over which one
lacks control, the libertarians argue that it is practically impossible to fulfill the conditions of
“authenticity,” which true moral responsibility demands.
The Consequence Argument, an argument that was variously developed by different
authors including David Wiggins, Peter van Inwagen, and John Martin Fisher, gives one of the
most important arguments against determinism.51 There are various versions of the Consequence
Argument, the most popular being van Inwagen’s version, first published in 1975 and further
refined in 1983.52 The argument raises a fundamental issue about “power necessity,” a phrase
that speaks to the inability of man to affect or change something that is already set or immutable.
For example, gravitational pull or force is a power necessity, the truth of which cannot be
falsified. Gravitational force will imply that if an object is thrown up, it must come down. Now,
since this writer does not have power to prevent the gravitational pull, he equally does not have
power to prevent the object from falling down. The Consequence Argument, thus, says that if a
person has no power over an occurrence or something, and does not have power over the fact
50
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that “the original” occurrence or something produces other occurrences or things as
consequences, then such a person does not have power over the “consequent” occurrences or
things.
In relationship to determinism, the argument assumes determinism to be true in part, and
that it is impossible to change “the facts of the past” and natural laws. With those assumptions
Michael McKenna presents the argument as follows:
1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail
every fact of the future (i.e. determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.53
The implication is that given determinism, no one is able to influence or affect his destiny.
Everything that will happen in the future has already been predetermined and we are all helpless
concerning the future. According to McKenna, “If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise
… If, according to the consequence argument, determinism implies that the future will unfold in
one way, and if no one has any power to alter its unfolding in that way, then it seems that, in a
very clearly presented manner, no one can do other than she does.”54
Realizing how difficult it is to attack the Consequence Argument on the basis of its
second premise, the compatibilists mount various attacks against the notion that determinism
precludes freedom and that for one to be able to “do otherwise,” one must have “alternative
possibilities.”55 One of the earliest opponents of the alternative possibilities argument is Harry
Frankfurt who, in a seminal paper written in 1969, exposes the fallacy of the “Principle of

53

Michael McKenna, “Compatibilism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism/ (accessed

July 18, 2012).
54

Ibid.
For a detailed analysis of compatibilists’ responses to the Consequence Argument, see Tomis Kapitan,
“A Master Argument for Incompatibilism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), 127-157.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
55

25

Alternative Possibilities (PAP)”.56 The basic stipulation of PAP is that a person cannot be held
morally responsible for an action he performs unless he has the ability to do otherwise. However
Frankfurt argues that even if a moral agent was precluded from alternative possible lines of
action, he could still be morally culpable, especially if it could be demonstrated that he would not
have done otherwise, even if he had the freedom or volition to do so. In other to prove his
theory, Frankfurt creates hypothetical situations whereby a person is deprived of the freedom or
volition to choose otherwise. However that person does not know that he no longer has the
ability to choose from different courses of action. Relying on an equipment he calls the
“counterfactual intervener,” Frankfurt presents a situation whereby the equipment is able to
monitor the person’s brain activities and “intervene” only if the person wants to do otherwise.
Frankfurt alludes to such examples whereby people who though acting under compulsion would
have done the same action, even if they were free to choose other courses of action or alternative
possibilities.
Following Frankfurt, several compatibilists have developed different variants of the
examples, which are called “Frankfurt-type examples.” Fischer highlights one of such examples
as follows:
Suppose Jones is in a voting booth deliberating about whether to vote for Gore or Bush.
After reflection, he chooses to vote for Gore and does vote for Gore by making his ballot
in the normal way. Unbeknownst to him, Black, a liberal neurosurgeon working with the
Democratic Party, has implanted a device in Jones’s brain, which monitors Jones’s brain
activities. If he is about to choose to vote Democratic, the device simply continues
monitoring and does not intervene in the process in any way. If, however, Jones is about
to choose to vote, for example, Republican, the device triggers an intervention that
involves electronic stimulation of the brain sufficient to produce a choice to vote for the
Democrat (and a subsequent Democratic vote).57

56

829-839

Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969):

57

John Martin Fischer, “Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi Compatibilism.” in The Oxford Handbook of
Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), 281-308 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

26

According to Fischer, as long as the “device” has nothing to do with Jones’s thought process and
actual voting, Jones must have acted “freely” and can be held “morally responsible for voting for
Gore.” The fact that he could not have done otherwise, if he had wanted to, does not matter in
this case. His decision would have been the same anyway, if he had not been constrained, or, if
the device had not been implanted in his brain. The fact that apparently he does not have
alternative means of action has nothing to do with his choice and moral responsibility.58
Even if one does not agree with Frankfurt’s argument and examples, and we do not, two
things are very obvious from his proposition against PAP. First, if determinism is not
compatible with human freedom and responsibility, it has nothing to do with lack of alternative
possibilities. Second, the freedom to choose otherwise is not a requirement for moral
responsibility. So far it can be demonstrated that one would have acted the same way, even if he
had the freedom to choose, the lack of such freedom does not absorb one of moral responsibility
for actions taken under such a situation. However, if one were to follow Frankfurt’s arguments
and examples to the logical conclusion, it would appear that the person with no alternate course
of action would be eventually constrained, and therefore could not be said to be free indeed. For
example, following Fischer’s example to the logical conclusion, a time would come when Jones
might want to take actions that are contrary to the wish of evil genius Black, at which point the
monitor would have to intervene and thereby constrain Jones. We will now look at contemporary
Modified Rationalism and how it sees the problem of evil.
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Contemporary Modified Rationalism and the Problem of Evil
There are many theistic systems; the most prominent ones being Theonomy, Rationalism
(exemplified by Leibnizian Rationalism), and Modified Rationalism, to which both Feinberg and
Plantinga subscribe. According to Modified Rationalism, God, as the Supreme Being, represents
the highest possible good and value, so that nothing can be done to enhance His value. In the
sense of perfection or completeness, God is perfect and totally complete that it is impossible to
add value to Him. Unlike Theonomy, which holds that logic and reason exist just because God
decrees them to be so and that God, in asserting His will, can decide otherwise,59 Modified
Rationalism believes that there is order and “rationality” to God’s decisions, especially
concerning His decision to create our world, which cannot be said to be arbitrary by any
standard. Modified Rationalism also differs from Leibnizian rationalism (or any form of
rationalism) in the sense that while Leibnizian rationalism sees God’s existence as a logical
necessity and that His primary design was to create the best world out of infinitely possible
worlds,60 Modified Rationalism believes that God was not under any obligation to create a socalled best world, and that He was at liberty to create any world or not create at all. However, if
God decides to create a world, all He has to do is to “create one of the good possible worlds,”
where a good world is defined as one that has more beneficial value (or goodness) than it
contains evil. Another distinguishing factor between Modified Rationalism and Theonomy and
Rationalism is its belief that while certain things are only knowable through divine revelation,
others can be discerned by reason.
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There are two forms of ethics in Modified Rationalism: non-consequentialism and
consequentialism. Non-consequentialism believes that “something other than consequence (e.g.,
God commands it; therefore, it is our duty) makes an act morally right or wrong.”61
Consequentialism, on the other hand, believes that what determines whether an act is good or
evil is the outcome or consequence it produces. Thus, in terms of problem of evil, the
consequentialists believe that although the world contains evil, God will eventually use it to
“maximize good,” and that because of this consequential effect which the evil will produce, one
can exonerate God from any moral responsibility.62 In other words, although God created evil,
we cannot hold Him responsible because evil will eventually lead to maximization of good; thus,
the end justifies the means. The non-consequentialists however believe that God did not create
evil (James 1:13-14) and that the world, as originally created, was free of evil. However, evil
came to be through the desires and “actions of God’s creatures.”63
Thus, Modified Rationalism boils down to whether our world is a good world, even with
evil in it. If the answer is yes, then a Modified Rationalist will have been able to solve his
problem of evil rationally and consistently in that the existence of an all-powerful and good God
will be consistent with the existence of evil. The argument is that the omnipotence of God does
not extend to doing logically impossible things. God can only do things that are logically
compatible with one another. For example, it is not possible for God to make a square circle.
For as long as it is logically impossible for God to eradicate evil and, at the same time, maintain
a world like ours with the goodness inherent in the theist’s postulation, God cannot be found to
be morally responsible for His inability or unwillingness to eliminate evil in our world.
61

John Feinberg, “Why I Still Believe in Christ, in Spite of Evil and Suffering,” in Why I Am a Christian:
Leading Thinkers Explain Why They Believe, edited by Norman L. Geisler and Paul K. Hoffman, 271-289. (Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 2006): 275.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.

29

CHAPTER 3
FEINBERG’S APPROACH TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF TRAGIC
MORAL EVIL
Feinberg’s approach to resolving the problem of tragic moral evil is predicated on his theology,
metaphysic, and ethic. According to Feinberg, his theology is based on moderate Calvinism with
a compabilistic version of Modified Rationalism and non-consequential ethic.64 For a thorough
understanding of Feinberg’s theodicy, it is necessary to understand the basis of his beliefs,
metaphysic and ethic. It is also necessary to explain Feinberg’s views on the nature of humanity,
sin and moral evil, and what he called the “price of utopia,” as background to his postulation on
the resolution of the problem of tragic moral evil. Only after this background information has
been presented can we clearly delve into his defense of theism against the arguments from tragic
moral evil.

Theological Belief: Calvinism and Compatibilism
In his “God Ordained All Things,” Feinberg explains the Calvinists’ view on “divine
control and human freedom.”65 He expounds too his belief in divine sovereignty and soft
determinism. To understand Feinberg’s belief concerning sovereignty, divine control, soft
determinism and human freedom, it is necessary to take an excursion into the Calvinist
theological system from which Feinberg derives his theological bases.
In Calvinism, God’s sovereignty can be expressed in terms of His governmental
“providence” over the creatural universe, including principalities and powers, things that are seen
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and unseen, material and immaterial, nature, cosmic systems, and human affairs. According to
Calvinism, the sovereignty of God is absolute in every aspect of creatural existence. However
while it is limitless in scope, it is compatible with the exercise of human freedom. The Calvinist
model of sovereignty means that nothing happens in the creatural universe without God and that
even humans disobedience ends up working for the glory of God, and the fulfillment of His
intended purposes.66
From the above, one sees that God is the ultimate source of all happenings in our
universe, and that whatever takes place does so in accordance with God’s a priori decisions from
eternal past. However, if everything happens according to the divine purpose of God, how can
one talk of human freedom or exonerate God from moral responsibility for evil, while laying the
responsibility for the atrocities of tragic moral evil at the doorsteps of humans? Furthermore,
how is the Calvinistic model different from fatalism? Before providing answers to those
questions, there is an integral part of this puzzle that has to be introduced at this point: divine
decree.
From the Calvinist point of view, “the divine decree” is God’s way of actualizing His
divine purpose or sovereign will. By divine decree, it is understood that God in the eternal past
had predetermined, through the “counsel of his will,” that all things happen according to his
divine purpose. According to strong Calvinism, God’s decree is predicated on His wisdom, and
can in no way be frustrated by any creaturely actions or decisions. In other words, God’s decree
is immutable and eternal. God uses His decrees to materialize His glory, which is the ultimate
purpose of His creaturely activities. Furthermore, Calvinism characterizes God’s decree as
efficacious and universal and sees it as the “blueprint” of what God intends to carry out in the
66
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lives of His creatures, but not as the “causal” effector of God’s divine action.67 The divine
decree is regarded metaphorically and anthropomorphically as the plan, while God carries out the
plan. God’s decree is also seen in its comprehensiveness in that it permeates every aspect of
human existence, no matter how big or how minute it is. Finally, God’s decree is predicated on
divine freedom, which speaks to the unrestricted and limitless liberty of God to cause a state of
affairs to be or not to be. From this point of view, one can see that God is not obligated to do
anything. Specifically, He is not obligated to create any world or do anything; rather He does
whatever He does because He so chooses. From this divine freedom, one can see the difference
between moderate Calvinism, which Feinberg subscribes to, and fatalism.
Distinguishing his belief (soft determinism) from fatalism (hard determinism), Feinberg
writes:
Rather, I hold what is known as consequent necessity. I believe that once certain choices
are made (by God or whomever) certain things follow as a consequence. But before
these choices are made, no inherent necessity dictates what must be chosen. For
example, it was not absolutely necessary that Adam sin in the sense that there was no
other Adam God could have created. Consequently, it was not absolutely necessary that
God decide to send Christ as redeemer. However, once having made the choice to create
Adam as sinning, it was necessary for God to send Christ as redeemer.68
Thus the major difference between moderate Calvinism and fatalism is acknowledgment of
God’s divine freedom by Calvinists which fatalism denies. The Fatalists believe in intrinsic
necessity, which obligates God to take a particular line of action such as creating our world the
way it is, while Calvinism believes in consequential necessity, which gives God the absolute
liberty to create or not to create.
However, is this distinction sufficient to absorb Calvinism from the charges that it
eventually leads to fatalism? Let us not forget that Calvinist understanding of God’s sovereignty
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is that everything happens according to predetermined and ordained purpose of God through His
divine decree, control, and will. If that were to be so, wouldn’t God be seen to be responsible for
all the happenings in the world, including evil and sin? Arguing along this line and as one
strongly opposed to Calvinism, Randall Basinger writes: “If God has decreed all events, then it
must be that things cannot and should not be any different from what they are. And if this is the
case, what sense does it make to try to make a difference? And hence a fatalistic attitude is
bound to follow.”69 From Basinger’s analysis, it is obvious that there is an apparent
contradiction in Calvinism, which needs to be resolved in order for the differentiation between
the Calvinist perspective on God’s sovereignty and fatalism to be valid. Furthermore, if evil
happens according to the preordained decree of God, how can evil or sin become an abomination
forbidden by God?
In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, Calvinists resort to the concepts of “divine
(or perfect) will” and “permissive will.” Divine (perfect) will is what God has decreed which
cannot be frustrated, while permissive will is synonymous with God’s command, which human
beings generally transgress. The permissive will of God allows man to exercise his freedom to
do or not to do what God has commanded. Although human beings can transgress the
permissive will of God, ultimately the divine or perfect will of God will prevail. It is in this light
that one should understand Calvinistic determinism (“soft” determinism), which emphasizes
God’s sovereignty through His divine decree and actual control. This can be demonstrated by
God’s dealing with Pharaoh over whom He eventually prevailed in bringing the children of Israel
out of the bondage of Egypt with His mighty hand of power (Exodus 5-12). Although this might
not be a good example in the sense that one can argue that Pharaoh was eventually coerced and
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overwhelmed to succumb to God’s divine will, it nevertheless illustrates how divine will
eventually prevails in the Calvinist system.70
The Calvinist will argue that although God’s divine will is eventually fulfilled, it is done
through God exercising His divine control in human affairs in such a way as to leave man the
ability to choose his actions without being constrained. On human freedom and determinism,
Feinberg believes that human actions can be genuinely free, even if there are causal determinants
or antecedent factors that move the agent into taking a particular action. His theory is that for as
long as the antecedent causes are not constraining, the action is free indeed.71 Thus, God is
exonerated from any responsibility, while humanity’s culpability for tragic moral evil is
established.
The argument is that man is ultimately responsible for his choices. As long as the man is
compatibilistically free even in the face of causal determinants or antecedent factors and as long
as those factors or determinant are non-constraining (i.e. do not in any way infringe on the ability
of the man to choose otherwise), any decision taken by that person must be subject to moral
responsibility. Since the person chooses out of his own volition without any actual or conscious
constraint, he and not God should bear the moral responsibility for the consequences of his
action. Furthermore, although God created an Adam that was capable of sinning, the decision to
sin was purely Adams.
From the above, one can probably say that the difference between the compatibilist
notion of free will and that of libertarian is a matter of degree, and that it boils down to the
acceptance or otherwise of the possibility of causal determinants or antecedent factors preceding
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human choices. While the compatibilists believe that for as long as the causal determinants or
antecedent factors are non-constraining, their presence does not negate the ability to do
otherwise. The libertarians, on the other hand, see the mere presence of those causal
determinants or antecedent factors as constraining even if they do not directly infringe on the
ability of the person to choose otherwise. The fact is that if the person had indicated any
tendency to choose otherwise, he would not have been able to do so. For the libertarians
freedom to choose or do otherwise means total freedom from any intervening factor.
Another dimension of Feinberg’s argument on moral responsibility is his disagreement
with the incompatibilists’ notion that the human being cannot be truly free unless he could “have
done otherwise,” or what is generally known as “the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” as
highlighted in the Consequence Argument. Although, Feinberg does not disagree with the need
for the free and moral agent to be able to choose from possible alternatives, nevertheless he
disagrees with the incompatibilists’ understanding of the phrase “could have done otherwise.”
According to him, the phrase should be understood in the context of the reasonableness of the
agent’s possible choices. Thus if someone is reasonably free to eat but chooses not to, then such
a person can be said to have reasonable opportunity to do otherwise. The fact that he chooses
not to eat instead of eating does not remove his ability to choose otherwise, even if there are nonconstraining antecedent causes. Thus “it is the very reasonableness of what he chooses which
commends the action to him so that he chooses according to his desires and thus (on a soft
determinist account) freely.”72
Finally, Feinberg presents five biblical and theological arguments, which have informed
his position on divine control and human freedom. The five biblical principles are God’s
sovereignty, God’s omniscience, predictive biblical prophecy, biblical inspiration, and eternal
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security. On the totality of those biblical and theological arguments, he is convinced that soft
determinism or compatibilism is the correct interpretation of human freedom and moral
responsibility. Let us try to summarize briefly his arguments concerning those five biblical
factors that have shaped his position.
With regard to God’s sovereignty, Feinberg relies very much on Ephesians 1:11, which
speaks of our predestination for salvation through Christ “according to the purpose of him who
worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” (KJV) From this passage, God’s purpose is
fulfilled through His divine will, while man’s freedom is compatibilistically determined. This,
according to Feinberg, is the only “scripturally acceptable way to avoid a contradiction between
the clearly biblical concepts of God’s sovereignty and human freedom.”73
The biblical notion of God’s omniscience also presupposes determinism, according to
Feinberg. Claiming that God can only know the future if determinism prevails, Feinberg argues
against indeterminism which, he says, contradicts biblical theistic teachings. He identifies three
indeterminist’s responses which, according to him, prove to be inadequate to resolve the
“indeterminist’s dilemma.” The first response by indeterminists is to deny God’s
foreknowledge. This is contrary to biblical pronouncements about God knowing not only what
was and is but also what is yet to come. The second is to claim God as eternal, but timeless.
According to Feinberg, God may be eternal, but He is not timeless in such a way that he does not
know the time in “human history.” The third response is to appeal to “middle knowledge,”
which speaks to “possibilities” instead of “actualities.” Middle knowledge addresses the
“prevolitional” knowledge of God in terms of every possible outcome that could have obtained if
the “actual” circumstances had not happened. In other words, God possesses the knowledge of
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how every creature will act no matter the circumstance that obtains in the future.74 The
advocates of middle knowledge, while acknowledging that God can influence human agent
choices, believe that such influence cannot be determinative but must be done in a way that
maintains the agent ability to choose freely from competing alternatives and be able to do
otherwise. While disagreeing with the proponents of middle knowledge, Feinberg argues that if
all that God had was middle knowledge, how was it possible for God to know
“counterfactually,” if determinism was never a factor.
Because of biblical prophecies regarding the future, Feinberg argues that the fulfillment
of a number of biblical prophecies is proof of determinism. According to Feinberg, only when a
prophecy is fulfilled can it be seen as authentic. This requirement of fulfillment presupposes
determinism. Otherwise, how do biblical prophecies come to pass, if there is no determinism?
Furthermore, it would be impossible for prophecies that have to do with the future to be fulfilled
if God were causally unable to move anyone to do His will.
On biblical inspiration, Feinberg states that the writing of the Scripture resulted from
divine inspiration of God that moved different men from different ages to write it. Relying on II
Peter 1:21, which states that “the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men
of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,” (KJV) Feinberg asserts that “biblical
writers did not write unless superintended and moved by the Holy Spirit.”75 This can only imply
one of two things: either God “dictated” everything written in the Scripture (“a dictation
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theory”), or a compatibilistically consistent “inspiration theory” that “allows both God and the
writer to be active in the process so as to guarantee that what God wanted was written.”76
Finally, Feinberg also attributes the formation of his beliefs regarding human freedom
and responsibility to eternal security, by which it is meant that a believer once saved remains
saved forever, and can never lose his “salvation.” This is denied by many indeterminists who
believe in the possibility of a believer falling from grace. Feinberg explains that if
indeterminism were true, believers would always be able to reject the atoning work of Christ and
become unsaved again. Although this is the traditional belief of the Arminians, Feinberg
believes that no matter what, the believer will always be pulled “toward continued faith”
(perseverance) which will enable him to endure in salvation. He then concludes that if eternal
security is correct, it can only be possible through some kind of determinism. We will now look
at Feinberg’s theistic system.

Theistic System: Modified Rationalism and Non-Consequentialism
Feinberg’s theism is based on Modified Rationalism with non-consequential ethics. As a
Modified Rationalist, Feinberg believes that our world is good and that the existence of evil does
not negate the attributes of God as an all-powerful and good God. As a non-consequentialist, he
believes that the origin of sin had to do with Adam’s disobedience and that our world was
without evil until man sinned. Although, he agrees with the theonomous assertion that
knowledge of ethics is transmitted through God’s revelation, he however disagrees with the
theonomous view that “ethical norms” are what they are because God said so and that there is
nothing inherently good or evil. Rather Feinberg believes “that actions are inherently good or
evil, because they reflect or fail to reflect something about God’s nature. God prescribes moral
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norms as a reflection of his character. For example … He is a God of love; to murder someone
or steal from him isn’t an act of love, so God forbids us from doing either.”77 We shall now
examine some background information that is germane to Feinberg’s defense of theism against
the problem of tragic moral evil.

Background to Feinberg’s Theodicy in Response to the Problem of Tragic Moral Evil
Feinberg’s theodicy is predicated on his assertion that “God can’t eradicate evil without
producing various problems,”78 as well as on his understanding of the “ontological constituents”
of man, the causation of sin, and desirability and cost of an utopic world with no evil. He says
that, on the one hand, if all God wants to do is to eradicate evil, He surely can do that. On the
other hand, God cannot eradicate evil “without 1) contradicting other valuable things he has
decided to do, 2) casting doubts on or directly contradicting the claims that he has all the
attributes predicated of him in Scripture, and/or 3) performing actions which we would neither
desire nor require him to do, because they would produce a greater evil than we already have in
our world.”79 Thus, all Feinberg probably needs to do is to demonstrate that our world is a good
one in spite of its inherent evil and God cannot eradicate evil without causing one or all of the
three things mentioned above to happen. We shall now look at Feinberg’s view on human
nature, the causation of sin, and the price of utopia.
However before we do that, we need to point out that although these are part of his
defense of theism against the logical problem of evil, it is noteworthy that he has adopted some,
if not all, of the same arguments in his attempt at resolving the evidential problem of tragic moral
evil. Furthermore presenting this material at this point will enable us to have a better
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understanding of Feinberg’s theological position, which will form the basis of our evaluation of
his defense. Having said that let us look at his view on man; especially the kind of man God
intended to create.

The Nature of Man
According to Feinberg, God endued man with cognitive capacity (the ability to think or
reason), capability of feeling and emotion (ability to express oneself emotionally and otherwise),
volitional capability (a compatibilistically free will that is expressed in desires, intentions, and
choices), and a physical body capable of movement and perform other body functions. Of all
God’s creatures, human beings are the only ones so endued. But why did God endue man with
such capabilities?
According to Feinberg, God gave us those “capacities” so that we can “live and function
in a world that is suited to beings such as we are.”80 In other words, God created a world in
which our ontological constitution is designed to function best i.e. the world was created to
enhance human functionality. Furthermore, God designed us as “finite” beings with enhanced
individuality, so much so that no two persons are the same. Each of us is distinctive in her
constituent being, so that those capacities, which constitute our being, are not present in the same
measure in another human. Some may have exceptional capacity for reasoning, while others
may be more emotionally expressive. In the words of Feinberg, “God intended to make a being
who is finite both metaphysically and morally (as to the moral aspect, our finitude doesn’t
necessitate doing evil, but only that we don’t have the moral perfection of an infinite God).81
Thus, it was never the design of God to create “superhuman” or angelic beings to inhabit our
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world. While it is true that the redeemed will eventually receive glorified bodies, the human
essence until then is actualized as a non-glorified natural body with all its limitations and
finitism.
Having thus theorized about the nature of man and our world, Feinberg defends the
source of his knowledge about God’s intentions in creating man and the world. According to
Feinberg, although no one else was there at creation and none has the capacity to query God
about His intentions at creation except for what the Scripture tells us, nevertheless one can
discern His intention through what He has done: the kind of man and world He created.
Realizing the possible pitfall of such an argument, Feinberg cautions that no one should attempt
to use it to justify the existence of evil. According to him, God could not have created moral evil
because such evil is not a substance but the result of the actions and desires of moral agents.
Furthermore, while human beings can act without fully comprehending the consequences of their
actions, God, as the Supreme Being with full knowledge and power, definitely knows what He is
doing and does what He intends to do at all time.
Feinberg then concludes that since God cannot actualize logical contradictions, it is
basically impossible for God to create the kind of human beings he thinks God intended to create
and remove evil at the same time without negating His purpose. Thus for Feinberg, the essence
of human being or the ontological constituents of man as man demands the existence of evil.
Thus, God cannot be held responsible for the existence of evil because it is logically impossible
for Him to eliminate it without contradicting or compromising His purpose or intention for
creating humans the way they are. The principle of moral responsibility, which confers
responsibility for acts of commission and omission on a being that has the capacity to do so,
frees God from such responsibility since he is not capable of doing logically impossible things.
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We will now look at the entrance of sin and moral evil into human existence.

Sin and Moral Evil
From the previous subsection, we see that a finite non-glorified human being is endued
with different capacities, some of which engender sin and moral fallibility. Such capacities
include human free will and desires. However since Feinberg is a Modified Rationalist with a
compatibilistic metaphysic, he cannot appeal to free will to articulate how human beings
descended into sin and moral deprivation. Rather he appeals to desire as the ultimate cause of
evil, getting his direction from James 1:13-15, which states that: “Let no man say when he is
tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted, neither tempteth he any man: But
every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath
conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.” (KJV)
According to Feinberg, the word epithumia, which is translated as “lust”, actually means desire.
Thus, desire is the point of conception of sin and moral evil, which once acted upon becomes sin.
Desire, by itself, is not evil, for there are many good things that people desire. An evil
desire will be a desire that is contrary to God’s ethical norms or something that is outright
disobedient to God’s moral precepts. Desire leads to intention, and intention to action. At the
point when desire translates to action, sin or moral evil is committed. As one can see, before the
physical body takes over in carrying out the action, the cognitive and volitive capacities are first
in play in conceiving the evil desire through human will which, according to Feinberg, is
“compatibilistic free will, for there are causally sufficient non-subsequent conditions that
decisively incline the will without constraining it to choose.”82
The Adamic transgression, the guilt of which was transferred to all of human race, did
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not negate the basic human endowment of cognition, volition, emotion, and body movement.
Rather, it marred the nature of man, but not to the extent of completely negating those Godendued qualities, which make him/her human. Desires, intentions, will, and physical movements
are still part of humanness, although the corruption of sin has made man to be naturally inclined
to sin, so that one can speak of the utter depravity of man (Gen. 6:5-6). It is this deprivation that
has made man to be more prone to desire things that are evil, and when acted upon lead to moral
evils. We will now look at what Feinberg calls “the price of utopia” to understand why he
believes that it is not desirable for God to eliminate evil given the nature of man and God’s
purpose for creating man the way He did.

The Price of Utopia
In discussing “utopia,” Feinberg envisages a world that is devoid of evil: what would
such a world look like, how desirable would it be, and what would it cost God and man to
actualize such a world, if it were possible? Feinberg articulates nine reasons why God cannot
create utopia “without producing further and greater problems,” stating that “if God did what is
necessary to remove moral evil from our world, he would either contradict his intentions to
create man and the world as he has, cause us to wonder if he has one or more of the attributes
ascribed to him, and/or do something that we wouldn’t expect nor desire him to do, because it
would produce greater evil than there already is.”83
The first possible way, identified by Feinberg, for God to eradicate all moral evil is to set
up human affairs in such a non-constraining way that human beings with compatibilistically free
will can only desire and do good. Feinberg contends that that is not as easy as it seems given the
interconnectivity of human existence. God would have to rearrange other people’s lives too,
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somehow constraining “them to do something that serves God’s purposes in regard to us, and
perhaps even turns them towards doing evil.”84 This will surely infringe on the free will of all
(even a compabilistic one), basic human capabilities, and the ability to live their lives the way
they desire. One might also wonder if God was truly omniscient and wise, if He had to do all
this to ensure that humans consistently choose good over evil all the time.
A more drastic option would be to destroy utterly humankind as a means of eradicating
evil. However, this option is not only unacceptable because “a living dog is better than a dead
lion” (Eccl. 9:4, KJV), but also because it would contradict God’s purpose and intention for
creating human beings. If God had wanted to do that, He would not have spared Noah and his
generation (Gen. 7:23).
A third option would be to remove “all objects of desire.” Feinberg argues that without
the objects of man’s desire or “bait,” it would be nearly impossible for man to be “led astray to
do moral evil.”85 However, this would be like throwing the baby away with the bath water, in
that all this would be tantamount to destroying the whole world, including human bodies and
anything that can constitute objects of desire. Obviously, this option would not be acceptable to
us, as human beings, and would contradict God’s purpose and plan for His creature.
The fourth option would be to do away with desire itself: that God could remove all
human desires in order to eradicate moral evil. This is predicated on Feinberg’s assertion that
desire is the root cause of sin and moral evil, since all sins are conceived by inordinate desires.
This will not only make it impossible for man to act (since action is propelled by desire), but also
contradict God’s purpose for creating humankind. With this option, all good desires will be
eradicated with the evil ones, thereby putting the very existence of humankind in jeopardy since
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desires for those things that sustain life such as food and desire for life itself will be impossible
to be conceptualized.
A fifth possible option would be for God to retain desires, but prevent them from being
stimulated to the point that they will produce intention to commit moral evil and to actually act
upon such intentions. Under this scenario, God will only intervene when the level of desire is
such that it will generate the intention to commit moral evil. One obvious drawback of this
option is that it negates God’s purpose to create human beings that are individually different
from one another. Allowing desires to be “aroused” to a certain level before shutting them down
will produce a “stereotype” effect in human, thereby negating the individuality within
humankind. How is this possible? Well, God would have to preprogram everybody in such a
way that He can intervene at the right time to prevent the desire from snowballing into intent to
commit moral evil. The other problem with this option is its effects on daily life. Each time a
desire is tending towards intention to commit moral evil; God would have to intervene, thereby,
creating an enormous disruption of daily life. Dismissing this option, Feinberg asks: “Would we
really want our lives to be interrupted constantly and our plans to be changing so continuously as
would be necessary if God made the world as we are imagining?”86
The sixth option is similar to the fifth, but different in the sense that God would allow
desires to develop beyond intentions, but would only shut them down if they were to produce
moral evil. In other words, God would only intervene just before the intention is translated into
action. This in a way might minimize the disruption to daily life since human beings normally
do not act on all of their intentions. Feinberg believes that this is still problematic in the sense
that it is still subject to the same limitations of the other options that have to do with elimination
of desires. Whether God intervenes miraculously or by preventing one from acting upon evil
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desires, it would still amount to abridgment of desires, which might negate the gift of
compatibilistic free will. Furthermore, it would appear that God would be extremely busy
having to intervene each time somebody’s desire turns to evil in order to prevent it from being
actualized. Obviously, such a God could not be said to be efficient and wise if He would employ
such a “fire brigade” approach. Such a God would not resemble, in any form or shape, the
theistic God who is said to be all-wise, all-powerful, and all-knowing.
The seventh option, identified by Feinberg, is for man to have only capacity for willing
good things. Thus, the capacity to will is shut down whenever one’s will tends towards evil.
This could be done through “miraculous intervention,”87 or by programming humankind in such
a way that it would be impossible for him to will evil. According to Feinberg, this option is
subject to the same limitations or objections as other options that have to do with desires and
intentions.
The eighth option, according to Feinberg, is for God to shut down body movements so
that it is impossible to actualize the evil intentions one might have conceived, no matter how
much he tries. This is not without precedent in that the Scripture informs us of God afflicting the
household of Pharaoh to keep him from having carnal knowledge of Sarah, wife of Abraham
(Gen. 12:17). While we do not know what kind of afflictions God placed on Pharaoh and his
household, can one expect this to be replicated every time someone decides to carry out evil
intentions? According to Feinberg, God could do this either by stopping body movement or by
miraculous intervention like in the case of Pharaoh. However, this option is not likely to succeed
for the same reasons the other options that have to do with desire, intention, and will are
unacceptable. This brings us to the last option.
The final option, identified by Feinberg, is God’s elimination of evil through “miraculous
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intervention at any point in the doing of an action (i.e. at desire, intention, willing or bodily
movement) or before the negative results of the action can impact the victim of an evil deed.”88
Feinberg raises several objections to this option. First, not knowing at what point God would
intervene would be problematic to our way of life and could lead to fear and paralysis, which
will contradict God’s purpose for creating the kind of man he created. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that this will lead to better world. Second, stopping body movements, in this way,
could also lead to physical paralysis, which would persist until the individual changed their
intended action. This obviously would not engender better world than our current one. Also,
eliminating evil desires, intents, or will would probably necessitate temporary memory losses or
outright unconsciousness so that those unwanted desires, intentions, and will could be erased.
Perhaps, a significant objection to such miraculous elimination of moral evil is the effect of such
action on our perception of God as the all-wise Being. The argument is that if God had to
intervene miraculously to remove evil desires, intentions and will, it would bring into question
His wisdom in creating man as He did. It probably would have been easier for Him to change
human nature. However, that would contradict His purpose for creating man in the way He did.
We will now look at Feinberg’s defense on the evidential problem of tragic moral evil.

Feinberg’s Approach to the Resolution of the Evidential Problem of Tragic Moral Evil
Feinberg’s defense against the evidential problem of tragic moral evil begins with the
rebuttal of the inductive and probabilistic arguments of the atheologians as used in relation to the
evidence of evil. He divides his defense into three sections. The first section deals specifically
with the problems of inductive and probability arguments, as well as the limits of knowledge.
This is the general formulation of Feinberg’s defense of the evidential problem, which can be
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applied to all forms of evidential problem of moral evil, including evidential problem arising
from the supposed gratuitousness and quantity of evil. The second and third sections of this
defense deal individually with evidential problem from gratuitous evil and quantity of evil
respectively.
Our approach in this section will be to look into Feinberg’s defense against the evidential
problem of evil first, by highlighting the problems with the inductive and probability arguments
of the atheologians. We will then highlight what is knowable and unknowable by human
knowledge. Finally, we shall speak specifically to the evidential problem arising from
gratuitousness of evil and the quantity of evil.

The Problems with Inductive Arguments
Highlighting the inductive problem of theism raised by the atheists, Feinberg states that
there are two strategic options that theists can use to defuse it: a defensive or offensive strategy.
The defensive strategy is predicated on “rebutting” the atheologians’ claim that theism is
improbable given the evidential problem of evil. In this regard, the theist does not have to
advance any positive information or argument supportive of theism. All he has to do is to show
the improbability of the atheist’s arguments. Once the atheists’ inductive arguments have been
discredited, the theist would have done his job. The offensive strategy, on the other hand,
demands that the theologian advances robust and positive arguments that shows that the
probability of theism, on the basis of available evidence, is greater than 0.5.
Of these two strategies, Feinberg believes that a defensive strategy is safest way to go.
For one, it keeps the burden of proof with atheists: since the atheist has taken it upon himself to
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discredit God’s existence on the evidence from evil, it does not help the cause of the theist to put
that burden on himself by trying to proof God’s existence. All the theist has to do is to
underscore the improbability of the atheist conclusion. The problem with the defensive strategy,
however, is that although it discredits the atheistic arguments against God, it does not explain,
for example, why there is so much evil in terms of its gratuitousness or quantity. The only way
to do that is to adopt the offensive strategy. This, Feinberg does in his defense of God against
gratuitous evil and quantity of evil. We shall now look at his defensive strategy against atheistic
argument from evil.
Feinberg’s “defensive strategy” argument in defense of theism is predicated on three
challenges from the atheologian evidential argument, which makes the atheologian argument less
likely to succeed. The first has to do with the inductive nature of the argument and the problems
associated with induction in arguing about the unlikelihood of the existence of God based on
evidence from evil. Usually induction is based on observation of particular instances of a
phenomenon from which a generalized idea or induction is made about that phenomenon.
However, the evidential problem cannot be easily fitted into that kind of generalization given the
diversity of observed evils, and human’s inability to objectively evaluate them, nor speak
categorically about the nature of the relationship between God and the observed evils. The fact
that there are several instances of evil proves nothing inductively about God’s existence or the
relationship between God and evil.
Feinberg argues further that for any form of the inductive argument against theism to be
effective at all, “it must be an argument of the form of hypothesis confirmation or
disconfirmation” in which “the only empirical data appealed to are instances of evil.”89
According to him, not only are we not able to properly evaluate those instances on the basis of
89
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any empirical evidence, but also that the very existence of evil has not been demonstrated to
have any actual connection to God. What we have from the atheologians is a hypothesis that is
backed up with “auxiliary assumptions,” with the “first premise” connecting the hypothesis to an
anticipated conclusion to the effect that since evil exists, then God does not exist. In the words
of Feinberg, “premise 1 makes no claim about what is the case; it is a conditional sentence that
speaks about what we can expect empirically if certain other things are true. Only the second
premise appeals directly to empirical data, but again, it doesn’t link the data to evaluation of
them or to God’s relation to them; it only states what is observed.”90 Since the relationship
between God and evil is not observable empirically, any postulation about that relationship has
to be done through a conditional premise. Thus, induction lacks empiricism concerning God’s
relationship with evil.
From the above, one can see that inductive argument from evil as evidence against God is
at best inferential, and, in most cases, highly subjective making any conclusions drawn suspect.
This is even made more difficult if one were to attempt to consider the total body of knowledge
which the inductive postulation mostly ignores, and which, if factored into consideration, will
surely disprove the argument. This, coupled with lack of evidential linkage between God and
evil, makes it difficult to prove that the atheist’ inference, from among other possible inferences,
is the right one to make. To buttress this point, Feinberg declares that “from the fact of evil, it is
possible to construct an inductive argument of the form in question in favor of the following
propositions (hypotheses): there is no God; there exists an evil God; there exists a good but
impotent God; or there exists an omnipotent, all-loving God with morally sufficient reason for
allowing evil.”91
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Furthermore, Feinberg argues that since human beings are the purveyors of moral evil, it
is much easier to establish an empirical relationship between man and evil than between God and
evil. Even so, there are many possible inferences that can be drawn from the relationship
between man and evil, so much so that it is impossible to demonstrate that one’s inductive
argument about the evidential relationship between man and evil is the correct one. If this is so,
it is rather unreasonable to assert a linkage between God and evil without empirically observable
basis.
Finally, Feinberg appeals to Plantinga’s challenge to the atheologian argument against the
rationality of theism. Based on Plantinga’s successful defense, it is generally agreed, by both the
theologians and atheologians that the existence of an all-powerful and all-loving God is logically
consistent with the existence of evil. If that is so, Feinberg argues that “when an atheist admits
that a theist’s defense can join without contradiction the existence of God and the existence of
evil, it seems that a stronger inferential case can be made for the view that an omnipotent, allloving God exists who has a morally sufficient reason for evil than for the view that there is no
God.”92 Feinberg then concludes that while it is possible for an atheist to postulate an inductive
argument based on particular evidence from evil, it is unlikely to succeed in view of the
aforementioned problems with such arguments.

The Problem with Probability Arguments
The atheist’s inductive argument also suffers from the difficulties of probability
arguments, which further minimize its likelihood of success. One of the difficulties that a
probability argument faces, says Feinberg, is its inability to reflect totality of evidential data
(including unknown counterfactuals) that will enable one to make a completely informed
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judgment. In most cases, the atheist’s argument is based on a single piece of evidence, usually
the existence of evil. However one has to be able to show the totality of evidence some of which
may support atheism, while many others may support theism. In view of such supportive
evidence for theism, it will appear ingenious for the atheologian to claim that God is improbable
in the face of evidence from evil.
On the probability front, perhaps the most devastating case against the atheist’s argument
has to do with the difficulties of determining the a priori probability of either theism or atheism
in order to apply Bayes Theorem to calculate the probability of the evidential hypothesis given
the “background information and evidence.” Given the subjectivity of assigning value to the a
priori probability of a given evidential theory or hypothesis, it is not surprising that one can
hardly get both the atheologians and theologians to agree on what that value is. While an
atheologian might want to claim that the a priori probability of theism is less than 0.5, the theist
would disagree. This highlights the difficulty of calculating the probability of theism based on
Bayes Theorem, claims Feinberg.
Furthermore, according to Feinberg, even if the relative importance of the a priori
probability is minimal, the other elements of Bayes Theorem such as the posteriori probability
have to be assigned values too, agreement on which (between the atheists and theists) might be
impossible to get. According to Feinberg, subjectivity comes into play because of the personal
involvement and beliefs of both atheists and theists, so that “no matter what theists or atheists
say to convince one another that their probability assessments are right, it is unlikely that a
convinced opponent will be persuaded.”93 We will now look at the limits of human knowledge
as it impacts the discussion on the evidential problem of evil.
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Limitation of Human Knowledge
In negatively arguing his case for theism based on the limitation of human knowledge,
Feinberg relies heavily on Garth Hallett94 and David O’Connor95 to show that our knowledge
about God and evil is extremely limited and that we “have little idea of just how far we are from
omniscience.”96 Feinberg quotes copiously from Hallett, and, on the basis of Hallett’s
arguments, which for limitation of space we will not get into here, argues that it amounts to
irrational pomposity for atheists to claim that there are no justifiable reasons for the evil in our
world just because we have no reasonable knowledge of what those reasons are, or for theists to
claim knowledge of why God allows evil, unless through divine revelation. Furthermore,
Feinberg writes:
Since the atheistic argument from evil rests heavily on whether there appears to be a
justifying reason for various evils and on what one would have done if one were God
(observations that can’t count for much in light of Hallett’s point about the implications
of our ignorance), I must agree in principle that it will be very hard to make a convincing
evidential argument against theism on the basis of evil.97
He however grants that it is possible to postulate the problem of evil in its logical or evidential
form once one realizes that it is not “an attack” directed at God, but, rather, against a
“theological” notion of God.98
The implication of the above, according to Feinberg, is that neither the atheist nor theist
has conclusive evidence to prove their case. However, since the burden of proof is on the atheist,
which he takes on himself once he ventures to disprove God’s existence, he (the atheist) will be
deceiving himself to think that he has advanced a coherent and successful argument from evil
against God’s existence. On the part of theists, it will be wise to put forward a defense rather
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than claim theodicy.99 We will now look at the offensive strategy employed by Feinberg in
arguing against evil as evidence against God.

The Problem of Gratuitous Evil
Feinberg begins his defense of theism from the problem posed by gratuitous evil by
analyzing Jane Trau’s argument that most atheologian arguments from gratuitous evil suffer
from three mistakes: question begging, the fallacy of ignorance, and jumping from inductive
argument to reach universal conclusion.100 While Feinberg believes that Trau is essentially
correct in that many atheologian arguments from gratuitous evil suffer from those three fallacies,
he argues that not all atheistic arguments fall into those traps or fallacies, and, therefore, cannot
be excused on the basis of Trau’s fallacy claim. According to Feinberg, a properly formulated
atheistic argument can avoid those pitfalls.101
For Feinberg, a proper discussion about evidence from gratuitous evil should start with
the definition of what constitute a gratuitous evil. According to him, evil can be defined
“narrowly” in terms of its failure to generate any ‘subsequent” good. In this regard, Feinberg
identifies two possible defense strategies, depending on whether one has a consequential or nonconsequential ethic.
For non-consequentialists, Feinberg believes that the most appropriate defense is to adopt
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Michael Peterson’s defense by rejecting the principle of meticulous providence [MP]102 and
accepting the existence of “genuine gratuitous evil” while at the same time demonstrating God’s
justification for allowing such evil in our world. Thus, depending on one’s theistic system and
metaphysics, one can adopt the free will defense or the natural law defense of Reichenbach if
one is an Arminian non-consequentialists, while a Calvinistic Modified Rationalist with nonconsequential ethic may adopt Feinberg’s defense, as stated earlier in this thesis.
Consequentialists, on the other hand, need to accept [MP], but reject the existence of
“genuinely” gratuitous evil in view of their belief that “evil in our world is tied (logically and/or
causally) to some subsequent good.”103 The greater good defense, and, to some extent, soulbuilding theodicy of Hicks fit this billing. The common theme of consequentialism is that
virtually all evils lead to the production of subsequent goods.
The second way to look at evil is to see it as the evil that is not a contemporaneous
“product” of an “antecedent” good. In this case, the strategies are reversed for nonconsequentialists and consequentialists. According to Feinberg, while the non-consequentialists
may argue that there are no genuinely gratuitous evils and that the apparent gratuitous evils are
either concomitant to or product of some antecedent goods, the consequentialists can follow one
of two options: either accept the existence of genuinely gratuitous evils and argue that God has
valid reasons for allowing them, or they may link the evil to some antecedent goods, and argue
that the justification for the evils resides not in the antecedent goods, but in the subsequent goods
such evil is needed to produce.
By combining the two definitions, Feinberg is able to articulate a broader definition of
102

According to Peterson, the principle of meticulous providence [MP] states, “an omnipotent, omniscient,
and wholly good God would prevent or eliminate the existence of really gratuitous or pointless evils.” If [MP] were
to be true, there would be no “gratuitous or pointless evil.” Nevertheless, empirical evidence seems to confirm the
existence of gratuitous evil. The strategy therefore is either to reject or accept [MP] depending on whether one is a
non-consequentialist or a consequentialist (For a fuller exposition, see Peterson, Evil and the Christian God, 76-77).
103
Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil, 382.

55

evil in such a way that the only genuinely gratuitous evils will be those that are neither
concomitant products of some antecedent goods nor producers of subsequent goods. In that case,
there will be virtually no genuinely gratuitous good since one can categorize almost all evils as
being produced by some antecedent goods or leading to some subsequent goods, so that an
“apparently gratuitous evil is only apparently so, not genuinely so.”104 We will now look at
Feinberg’s defense of theism from the evidential problem arising from the quantity of evil.

The Problem of the Quantity of Evil
Feinberg opens his defense of theism against the evidence from the quantity of evil by
trying to decide what constitutes excess or “surplus” evil. Recalling Snyder’s argument that a
serial killer with seven murder victims probably committed surplus evil in the sense that the last
two murders might not be necessary for the serial killer’s character formation, Feinberg asks if
those seven murder would have been excessive for character formation if they had been
committed by seven different killers rather than the serial killer. Although, he concedes that one
can still argues that those were seven murders too many, it may be difficult to postulate that there
is too much evil, without understanding why God will allow it, in the first instance.
Furthermore, if the atheist were to argue that there is too much evil in the world for God,
if He exists, to allow, it will be necessary to know to which God they are referring. Is it the
theonomist’s God, or the Leibnizian God, or the Modified Rationalist’s God? Each of these
theistic systems has different conceptions of God, and it would be necessary to understand to
whose God the atheist is referring. According to Feinberg, it would be very difficult for the
atheist to make a surplus evil case against the theonomist’s God and Leibniz’s God. However,
against the Modified Rationalist’s God, it is possible for an atheist to make a case based on the
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quantity of evil. The Modified Rationalist will have to postulate some antecedent or subsequent
goods, which necessitate the existence of so much evil, and unless he is able to do that, it will be
very difficult to rationalize the amount of evil in our world.
However, even, if the atheist can pose an evidential problem based on the quantity of
evil, it will still be difficult for both the atheist and theist to reach agreement as to what is too
much evil. The atheist usually formulate the problem from the quantity of evil in terms of how
much evil they would have allowed if they were God. The argument is that if man, who is
limited in morality, would create a world with less evil, why would not an omnipotent and allloving God do it or better. The fallacy of this argument, according to Feinberg, is that without
knowing what God knows, it would be foolhardy to speculate what one would have done
different from what God had done. To buttress this point, Feinberg states: “From our dimension
of knowledge, less evil may seem possible and preferable. But from the perspective of
omniscience with far clearer understanding of how evil fits into God’s overall plans and purposes
and of how it interconnects with goods and other evils, we can’t be sure we would create any
different world than the one we have.”105
Another reason, initially raised by Peterson but adopted by Feinberg, is that judgment as
to how much evil one thinks God should allow is a subjective judgment that is dependent on
one’s “personal value.” While atheists may be convinced that the quantity of evil in our world is
excessive, the theists might just think that the amount of evil is about right, making it very
difficult for either side to build a formidable probabilistic case for their judgmental call. This is
further compounded by our inability to understand why “certain things” take place. In adopting
Hallett’s view, Feinberg argues that the fact that we are unable to causally link some evils to a
particular good is non-indicative that such a link does not exist.
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Appealing to another Hallett’s view, Feinberg offers a “final reason” why it might be
hard for theists and atheists to agree on the existence of excess or surplus evil. According to
him, often, theists formulate a general proposition, which is then applied to various instances of
evil. However, one soon discovers that one size does not fit all. The implication is that one’s
postulation does not explain every instance of evil, which causes the atheist to claim that since
theist cannot explain all instances of evil, there must be excess evil. This probably is the case
with Snyder’s surplus evil argument on the basis of the sixth and seventh murder by the serial
killer. However, according to Feinberg, it is wrong to ascribe a single reason for all the instances
of evil as exemplified by Snyder’s seven-murder example. For all we know, God could have
different reasons for allowing each of the murders. Thus, “the evils we think are surplus or too
much may not at all be, because they may have a different purpose and explanation than we
think.”106
Having established the difficulties of reaching consensus on what constitutes surplus evil,
Feinberg then presents his view on how a Calvinist with Modified Rationalism will defend
theism against the evidence from quantity of evil. He alludes to his argument about God’s
intention to create non-glorified humans, and not “superhuman” or “subhuman’s,” as well as the
fact that God created a world that is suitable for the designed functionality of humans. The
question one should ask, according to him, is whether we need as much evil as we have to
achieve God’s purpose for His creature. Feinberg’s argument is that for as long as God desires
to have the kind of human beings He created, He cannot remove moral evil without causing
disruptions to His established purpose (see the section of this thesis titled “The Price of Utopia”
above for Feinberg’s detailed arguments).
Perhaps, the only possible way for God to minimize the quantity of evil, in a non106
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problematic way, is to reduce the number of human beings, according to Feinberg. This can only
be done if God will minimize the ability of humans to procreate through biological
reprogramming, or by killing as many humans as necessary to achieve the desired quantity of
evil. However, this will not be according to God’s purpose. Even, if God were to do that,
Feinberg argues that it might still not satisfy the atheists since they might still argue that the
reduced amount of evil is still excessive.
Feinberg’s conclusion is that because the quantity of moral evil cannot be actually known
and accurately calculated, it will be difficult for atheists to prove that the quantity of moral evil
in the world contradicts the existence of God. Feinberg believes that he has given logical and
coherent answers to the “logical and evidential problems” arising from the amount of moral evil
in our world. Has he? We shall endeavor to answer this question in the next chapter of this
thesis.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM OF EVIL: AN EVALUATION OF JOHN FEINBERG’S
THEODICY ON TRAGIC MORAL EVIL
In evaluating a theodicy or defense, the most important question to answer is whether the
theodicy or defense is logically and internally consistent in resolving the apparent contradiction
between the existences of an all-powerful and all-loving God and evil. Needless to say a defense
will only be deemed successful, if it is not self-contradictory in both its assumptions and
conclusions. Therefore, before we embark in evaluating and assessing Feinberg’s defense of
theism against tragic moral evil, we must establish the criteria for our evaluation.
The first criterion is defining what constitutes success of a theistic defense, especially in
view of the likely objections that might be raised against it. Obviously, for a defense to be
successful, it must successfully refute all the objections that might be raised against it. It is
noteworthy that Feinberg anticipates various objections that might be raised against his defense,
and tried to refute them. We will consider those objections and more, and his refutation of them
in order to assess how successful he is in rebutting them.
The second criterion for evaluating a Christian theistic defense is to compare and contrast
its theological foundation against the Scripture. For a Christian theistic defense or theodicy to be
considered sound, it must derive from the inerrant and infallible word of God. We are therefore
going to evaluate Feinberg’s defense of tragic moral evil on the basis of its exegetical accuracy.
Now, it must be said that there are different theistic systems with different interpretations and
understandings of the Scripture. The fact that one does not agree with the theistic system or the
theological basis for the defense does not nullify an argument, as long as that system is external
to the argument and does not constitute an integral part of the argument. As Feinberg himself
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indicates, the fact that one does not agree with someone theistic system does not invalidate his
arguments unless it is fundamentally flawed and is theologically indefensible.
Perhaps, the main component of our evaluation will be the assessment of the internal
consistency of the defense in relation to its theistic system. Specifically, we are going to
evaluate Feinberg’s defense of tragic moral evil against its metaphysic and ethic. Feinberg has
indicated that he is a moderate Calvinist and Modified Rationalist with compatibilistic
metaphysic and non-consequential ethic. We will therefore, evaluate Feinberg’s defense against
his professed metaphysic and ethic. Having said that, let us start with the evaluation of the
internal consistency of Feinberg’s theistic defense against the evidence from tragic moral evil.

Internal Consistency
The most significant factor in evaluating a theodicy or defense against the problem of
tragic moral evil is the internal consistency of the theodicy. This is because many atheists
believe that theodicy is fundamentally self-contradicting in terms of how one can justify the
coexistence of evil with an almighty, all-knowing, and all-benevolent God. On the surface, this
is an irreconcilable proposition. However, theologians and theistic philosophers have not shied
away from trying to proof that what is considered to be logically impossible is actually probable
and rational. Both the atheologians and theologians have come to agree that a defense or
theodicy can be seen to be logical and rational if it is internally consistent with its metaphysical
and ethical underpinnings.
From this, it is obvious that what we have to be concerned about is how well the defense
is able to resolve the apparent self-contradiction between God and tragic moral evil. For
example, a theological system that says that God is able to remove evil, but does not demonstrate
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a morally sufficient reason why God does not remove evil, will be considered internally
inconsistent. If God could remove evil, one would expect Him to do so unless there are morally
sufficient reasons not to do so. However if the theist is able to demonstrate morally consistent
reasons why God will not remove evil, even though He has the capacity to do so, then one cannot
fault such a theist on the basis of the internal consistency of his theology. It will not matter
whether one agrees with the theist’s theological system or belief.
In discussing the internal consistency of a theistic defense or theodicy, it will appear that
one is evaluating the rationality of theism rather than the inductive and probabilistic arguments
arising from the evidential problem of evil. While this might be so, it is highly skeptical if the
evidential problem of evil can be totally divorced from the logical problem. Feinberg clearly
sees the evidential argument to be parasitic on the assumptions of the logical argument. The
evidential argument, in most cases, deals with either the sheer quantity of evil or its
gratuitousness as evidence against the existence of God. In some simple cases, some may argue
that the mere existence of evil is an evident against God’s existence. Whether it is stated in
terms of the mere existence of evil, its quantity, or gratuitousness, Feinberg concludes that the
evidential problem draws from the logical problem of evil. For this reason, Feinberg, in his
theistic defense against the evidential problem of evil clearly relies on his arguments against
logical problem of evil.107
Given this, it would seem that the right place to begin the evaluation of Feinberg’s
defense would be a determination of its internal consistency to see if the defense exhibits any
self-contradictions. Furthermore, one has to understand that any theistic defense against evil has
to resolve the logical problem successfully in order for it to be a candidate for serious
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consideration when it comes to the evidential problem. What then are the fundamentals of
Feinberg’s defense against the problem of tragic moral evil?
As already mentioned, Feinberg’s defense of theism against tragic moral evil is
predicated on a compatibilistic version of Modified Rationalism with a non-consequential ethics.
As a Modified Rationalist, Feinberg believes that God is not obligated to create any world, and
that if God decided to create a world at all, He would only be required to create a good world.
As a soft determinist, Feinberg holds a “compatibilisitic account” of human freedom and
responsibility. As a non-consequentialist, he believes that the consequence of an action or thing
does not determine the goodness or otherwise of it. Rather, the goodness or evilness of a
particular action or thing is inherent in the nature of God, and not just the precept or
pronouncement of God about it. For example, because God is love, He expects all His children
to love their neighbors as themselves and not do anything detrimental to their neighbors.
Similarly, because God is merciful, He expects His people to be merciful also.
Feinberg’s fundamental argument is summed up in his assertion that God is unable to
actualize logically impossibility and that He cannot remove evil without abridging human’s
compatibilistic freedom, actualizing greater evil, or contradicting His purpose for creating the
human specie He had created. Now, how do we assess the internal consistency of Feinberg’s
theistic defense? Obviously, we have to start with the evaluation of his defense against the
theistic system that forms the basis of his belief. We need to determine if our world is one of the
possible good worlds. We also have to see if there is self-contradiction within his notion of what
God can do vis-à-vis the existence of evil.
According to Feinberg, although there are “good and bad worlds,” there is no single
world that can be said to be the best. Furthermore, God has no obligation to create any world.
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However, if God decides to create a world, all that He has to do is to create a good one.
Therefore, the atheist’s argument that God could have created a better world that contains less
evil that what we have in our world is external to the theistic system that constitutes the basis of
Feinberg’s belief. Even if God could have created a better world, once it can be demonstrated
that our world is one of the possible good worlds, Feinberg would have done his job as a theistic
defender with compatibilistic Modified Rationalism. Our world is inherently good because on
balance it contains more good than evil. Therefore, according to Feinberg, it is unfair to require
a theistic defense to prove that our world is a better world than any other possible good world.
The Modified Rationalist never claims that; neither does Feinberg.
On God’s ability to eradicate evil, Feinberg maintains that God cannot eradicate evil
without going contrary to His stated objectives or goals, disconfirming or creating doubt about
His attributes, and/or creating a sequence of actions that can lead to worse evil than we currently
have. According to Feinberg, in other for God to eradicate evil, He would have to fundamentally
change the nature of man or intervene in such a way that will bring life to a halt the way we
currently know it. It is not certain that such intervention would work to the advantage of man
and that it would be preferred to our current world system. What is certain is that if God wanted
to create sinful man, He must provide him with such an environment that would ensure that he
not only thrives, but also is able to accomplish God’s purposes and goals for creating him.
Feinberg believes that our world serves that purpose, and we tend to agree with him.
Does God have logically consistent reasons for allowing evil? While Feinberg believes
He does, Feinberg’s argument is not based on why God would not remove evil, even though He
has the ability to do so. Rather, his argument is predicated on the fact that God does not have to
remove evil because He is neither obligated nor able to do so without compromising some other
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goods that are important to Him and His creature. According to Feinberg and many theologians
of the Modified Rationalism extraction, if the only thing God has to do is to remove evil, then He
can do that without any problem. However, when there are other objectives that are logically
inconsistent with removal of evil, and given that God cannot actualize illogicality, it would be
wrong to expect Him to do so.
Thus, from above, we can see that Feinberg’s theistic defense against tragic moral evil is
internally consistent and free of self-contradiction. However, that does not mean that one has to
agree with every one of his explanations or with his theistic system, metaphysic, or ethic. Even
if one were to disagree with his theology, so far there is no self-contradiction inherent in his
theology and defense, one can clearly say that Feinberg’s defense of God against the problem of
moral evil is successful.
Also, on the basis of induction and probabilistic argument, Feinberg’s evidential defense
is very sound. His arguments about the difficulties of inductive arguments of the type required
by the evidential problem of moral evil are well stated and straight to the point. Some of these
arguments have been highlighted above, so that there is no need for us to rehash them here.
Given the subjectivity of induction and the possibility of various interpretations, it is most
unlikely that inductive arguments of the types mounted by atheist against theism can succeed.
After all, as Feinberg himself asks: “Since atheists agree that theists can show that evil is
logically consistent with theism, how likely is it that atheists can make a convincing case that
evil is strong evidence against theism?” We tend to wonder the same and agree with Feinberg on
this.
On the probabilistic case of the atheists against theism given evil as evidence, most
theistic theologians/philosophers including Feinberg and Plantinga are able to demonstrate the
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inherent problems with Bayes Theorem, especially with respect to the subjectivity of both the a
priori and posteriori probabilities. Furthermore, the inability to reflect the whole body of
knowledge in a probabilistic calculation is a drawback to the probabilistic arguments against
theism. Since the atheist has taken the burden of proof upon himself, all the theist has to do is to
play defense or parry the attack of atheists that use evil as evidence against God. However,
Feinberg does more than that; he not only shows the futility of the atheistic arguments from evil
against God, but also demonstrates offensively why the atheists’ case cannot stand.
Feinberg also effectively demonstrates that the atheists are wrong to postulate and declare
categorically the non-existence of God based on limited human knowledge. According to him,
any discussion about what God can do or not do, and what our world would be like if truly there
was a Supreme God with infinite power and kindness is speculative at best. Unfortunately for
human beings, we do not possess omniscience, and, therefore our knowledge of such things is
extremely limited. Therefore, nobody, atheist or theist, except someone who has received divine
revelation, can claim to know the mind of God or to have the ability of foreknowledge to the
extent of determining what our world would have been if there were such a Supreme God.
While this argument does not validate the existence of God, it does not invalidate it either. Since
the atheist has the burden of proof, it is incumbent on him to prove conclusively with
incontrovertible evidence that God does not exist. However, he cannot do that because such
evidence does not exist, at least within the grasp of our human knowledge.
In the light of the above, it is probably safe to say that not only has Feinberg successfully
defended the rationality of theism, but, also successfully punctured the evidential problem from
evil raised by the atheists. Based on criteria for evaluation,108 we can conclude that Feinberg’s
theistic defense against tragic moral evil is not self-contradictory, but internally consistent.
108

Please see pp. 60-61 of this thesis.

66

According to one of the criteria, which is consistent with the rule Feinberg himself applied in
evaluating other theistic systems and theodicies,109 a defense or theodicy will be deemed
successful if it demonstrates internal consistency within its metaphysical and ethical belief. As
mentioned earlier, Feinberg has shown himself to be a moderate Calvinist and Modified
Rationalist with compatibilistic metaphysic and non-consequential ethic. Thus, it is in respect of
his theistic system, metaphysic, and ethic that we safely conclude that he is consistent within his
belief. However, it is another kettle of fish if one, who does not have the same metaphysical and
ethical belief, will agree with his conclusion. Even if one disagrees with him, such
disagreements will be external to his defense, and therefore cannot invalidate it. In that regard,
one can say that our concession on the internal consistency of Feinberg’s arguments does not
indicate that they are credible outside his theistic system, but that he, using his own
characterization, is one of the “theists who can tell a logically consistent story when they talk
about God and evil.”110 We will now evaluate his defense on the basis of exegetical accuracy,
holding the Scripture as infallible and inerrant word of God.

Exegetical Accuracy
Many doctrines and discussions on theodicy have their basis in philosophical reasoning
and rationalization and not on careful perusal of biblical revelations. It is not surprising that
most of the conclusions tend to band around predefined philosophical logics. While one cannot
argue against the utility of logic, it is worthwhile to point out that spiritual things are not always
discernible with logic, even as Paul opines that “For the preaching of the cross is to them that
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perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God.”111 He further
admonishes the believers to “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit,
after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world and not after Christ.”112 One cannot
but notice the virtual absence of Christ in many discussions of theodicy. Also, most of the
literature on theistic theodicy focuses on finding justification for the greater goods achievable
within the present world, not paying adequate attention to the Scripture and the eschatological
ramifications of the problem of evil.
In evaluating a theistic defense in the face of evil or theodicy, it is absolutely necessary to
look critically at the defense with a view to establishing how closely it reflects the truism of the
Scripture, which is the breathed word of God and therefore inerrant and infallible. The Bible
becomes the barometer or the yardstick for measuring how well a defense reflects the truth of
God. Unfortunately, this is not true of many theodicies, which tend to see the problem of evil as
a philosophical and scholastic discussion. However, if one were arguing about how rational and
probable the existence of God is, wouldn’t it make more sense for a theologian to appeal to
theism and what the Scripture says about God as evidence just as the atheologians have resorted
to evil as evidence against God? Fortunately, Feinberg as a Calvinist theologian, establishes his
defense on the Scripture. While one might not agree with his Calvinistic theology, this writer
being an Arminian himself, one can relate with Feinberg on the basis of Calvinism. Therefore,
in carrying out this exegetical evaluation, this writer’s Arminian background might show and so
inform any disagreement he might have with Feinberg. However, even if we disagree with him
on the basis of theology, such disagreement will be external to his defense and will not, in any
form or shape, affect the consistency of his defense which has already been adjudged to be solid.
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Having said that, we will now examine the exegetical accuracy of Feinberg’s defense of theism
against tragic moral evil using the Scripture as our barometer for measuring what we consider
accurate or not accurate.
In postulating his defense of theism against the problem of evil, Feinberg began with a
question “What is man?” In answering this question, Feinberg reveals the basic theological
underpinning of his defense with respect to what kind of man God wanted to create. According
to Feinberg, it was God’s intention to create human beings with compatibilistic freedom with
reasoning faculty, emotive capacity, and ability to choose, and utilize the will power with which
his creator endues him. A further concept of man, given by Feinberg, is man’s existence in a
non-glorified body. According to Feinberg, God intentionally created man capable of sinning
and gave him a non-glorified body because God wants man to spend “the first stage” of his being
in a “natural” body, until in the eschatological dispensation when he (i.e. the man or being)
would be clothed in moral perfection and glorified body. Also, as stated by Feinberg, God
intended to create a being that is “both metaphysically and morally” finite. How do we
understand this finitism of man? Does it has to do with his moral imperfection or limits to his
capability? It is obvious that Feinberg wants us to see man as being created as morally imperfect
and metaphysically limited. If that were to be true, it would imply that man was created in
imperfection and made fallible by design. Is that actually so? Our contention is that if that is
what Feinberg has in mind, we cannot but think that he errs, at least with respect to moral
imperfection of man and his being created ontologically fallible. This we shall demonstrate
using scriptural account of creation.
The story of creation tells us that God created the heaven and the earth and everything
that is therein. The awesomeness of God is declared daily by His works and his relationship with
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man, the jewel of His earthly creation. In creating man, God created him in His own image and
after His own likeness (Gen. 1:26-27). According to the Scripture narrative, the creation of man
was special and different from all other creations that God had made. Man was created with
unique ability to reason, to be imaginative and self-conscious, to be relational both with God and
self, and was endued with outstanding spirituality to decipher right from wrong, just from unjust,
and to promote universal harmony in accordance to God’s holistic standard. As a rational
creature, God gave man the freedom of choice, but held him accountable for his choices. At the
end of His creational activities, God saw that everything that He had created “was very good” (v.
31).
Furthermore, God, in His creational mandate, blessed Adam and Eve and enjoined them
to be fruitful and multiply and to take dominion over His creation (Gen. 1:28). God also
appointed Adam a priest over the Garden of Eden in asking him to work (abad) and to keep
(shamar) it. It is worthwhile to note that the same Hebrew words (abad and shamar) are used in
describing the priestly functions of the Levites (Num. 3:7). Adam was to not only replenish the
earth and multiply the God’s image bearers, he was also to be God’s royal vice-regent. However
with the fall, the image of God was fractured or marred, and there was the need for new creation
to totally restore the image of God in its original perfection.
How should we then regard the creation of man? Was he created imperfect and as a child
who knew not his left from right?113 As already stated above, man was created in the image and
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likeness of God and was declared “very good.” Before we look into what it means to be created
“very good,” perhaps a look at Gen. 2:7 will give us a better understanding of the kind of
excellence God made possible in creating man. According to the passage, “the Lord God formed
the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man
became a living being.” While Gen. 2:7 uses the Hebrew word yatzar (“to form”) to express the
creational work in the making of the man, Gen. 2:22 uses banah (“to build”) to describe the
creation of the woman. The two words clearly indicate creativeness and complexity of the
process inherent in the formation of man and woman. Furthermore, man became a living soul
only after God breathed the breath (ruach – also translatable as “spirit”) of life into him. From
this, it is clear that man is ontologically composed of material body and immaterial spirit, visible
body and invisible spirit. It was the Spirit the First Cause that made it possible; for without the
inbreathing of the Spirit, man could not have lived.
Now concerning the meaning of “very good,” we must recall that God, the perfect and
Supreme Being, uttered those very evaluative words. This must connote a sense of satisfaction
and a degree of perfection. Perfection means completeness. To be perfect is to be “complete” in
every possible way and nothing can be added to make the object of the perfection to be better.
Now, depending on one’s understanding of “very good,” one can surely say that God was very
pleased with His creatural work. Knowing God as a “perfect” Being (Matt. 5:48), one would be
safe to assume that God accomplished His purpose; creating a person who gladdened His heart
and was created to give Him pleasure (Rev. 4:11). In addition, since we know that God, by His
nature, is sinless and that man was created without sin, the “very good” connotation that God
gave His handiwork must imply spotlessness (without blemish) and moral purity. Obviously, a
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pure and holy God could not have created the jewel of His creation, which was to function as His
royal vice-regent with a sinful DNA. It will make better sense, given the nature of God, to
assume that man was created in moral perfection and sinless. Now, if we understand perfection
as faultlessness, how then do we understand the limits of man? After all, the Scripture tells us
that God made man “a little less than God and crowned him with glory and honor.” (Ps. 8:5,
HCSB) In our opinion, man being made a little lower than God can only imply limitations in
comparative ability and power relative to God or heavenly angelic beings. It does not imply
moral impurity or imperfection. For example, because of the physical body in which he is
encased, man’s mobility relative to angels’ is limited. In addition, angels, being spiritual beings,
might possess other abilities and might not be ontologically limited like human. God gave both
angels and humans free will, or, using Feinberg’s preferred terminology, desire. Some angels,
succumbing to their evil desires just like men and misusing their free will, rebelled and fell out of
grace and were driven out of heaven. According to the Scripture, man became morally impure
after the Original Fall. Nevertheless, man’s goodness was definitely sufficient for the purpose of
His creation. Also, the fact that God created every other earthly living creature in mature form,
capable of procreating, would be indicative of the fact that man was not created a child as
claimed by theologians in the Irenaean tradition. In addition, immediately after man was created,
God blessed him to multiply and replenish the earth (Gen. 1:28). Obviously, a child could not
have been ready to reproduce. Also, God honored Adam by bringing all the earthly living
creatures to him, and the Bible says that whatever the name Adam called them so were their
names (Gen. 2:19-20). A child could not have done that. If Adam was supposed to be the royal
vice-regent of God on earth, he must have been created with intellectual and physical maturity.
We therefore disagree with Feinberg that man was created as a morally imperfect being.
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To argue that way will seem to imply that God deliberately created man to fall. As far as we
know the fall of man had nothing to do with his original DNA at creation. As we have tried to
demonstrate, man was created with moral perfection especially, if we understand perfection in
terms of completeness. All it means for something to be complete is that it is impossible to add
anything to make it better. For example, God, being perfect in every way, is complete in
Himself and cannot be made better. In addition, God cannot be corrupted because He transcends
all His creation. However, man is immersed in his environment, and therefore susceptible to the
forces and elements of nature. Our contention here is that at creation man was given moral
perfection but was corrupted by his environment, specifically by the Deceiver. Man’s perfection
does not mean that it cannot be diminished. While a perfect being cannot be made better, it is
possible to make it worse by soiling or by removing some or all the attributes of perfection
inherent in it. This obviously is what happened to man when he sinned, resulting in the
fracturing and marring of the image of God in man. Adam was separated from God and most of
the attributes he shared with God were dimmed and diminished in intensity, if not totally
removed. The glory of God, which covered him, was taken away and he became aware of the
nakedness of his existence.
We also disagree with Feinberg that God intended to create a being with a non-glorified
body. We believe that God intended to create man with physical body that will allow him to be
visible and personal, and provide him with the ability to move about in the world that He had
created. We agree with Feinberg that God wanted to create a being that would not only be
emotive, cognitive, and volitional, but also possess desires, ability to be intentional, and move
bodily. That is the extent of our agreement with Feinberg on this matter. God also gave the man
free will to choose and do what he wants which, in our view, is incompatibilistic free will as
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opposed to Feinberg’s compatibilism. However, we are not going to go into philosophical
arguments about the merit of incompatibilism over compatibilism, or vice versa. Rather, we are
going to speak to the fact that man was not created with a non-glorified body as claimed by
Feinberg.
It is a known fact that God made the man a spiritual being with a physical body. The
spiritual component of man is what connects him to God (John 4:24). Now, if one recognizes
“glorified” body as entailing physical perfection without death and diseases, then Feinberg
would be wrong to claim that God created man with a non-glorified body. Perhaps, to get a
better understanding of the nuances of this argument, we have to understand the purpose of
glorification of the saints. Simply put, the purpose of glorification of the saints is to transform
their current physically corrupted and mortal body to an incorruptible and immortal body that
will allow believers to enjoy a blissful existence in the eschaton when God will wipe away tears,
and there will be no more sorrow, affliction, or death (Rev. 21:4). This would be done in the
new creation, which has already begun with the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, but will be
culminated with His Second Advent. Writing on this, Paul states that “flesh and blood cannot
inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption… In a moment, in the
twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised
incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this
mortal must put on immortality.114 Also John, writing on glorification, states “Blessed and holy
is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power, but they
shall be the priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand year.”115 But why
is the New Creation necessary and why does man need to be transformed in order to attain to the
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kingdom of God? Have human beings always been marred in corruption and mortality?
We have previously indicated that God created man in His own image after His likeness.
Although, man was made a little lower than God, he was nevertheless crowned with honor and
glory (Ps. 8:5). God was also said to have attested that all His creation was very good.
Furthermore, the man was appointed a priest over the Garden of Eden and was to be God’s royal
vice-regent on earth. The man was not created in corruption, neither was he mortal. To the
extent that there was no death or suffering until the man transgressed God’s command as
concerning the forbidden fruit (Gen. 3:1-7), one can say that man was not created mortal. The
Lord instructed the man in righteousness and warned him of the consequences of his
transgression: “but you must not eat from tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you
eat of it you will surely die.”116
Thus, the notion of death was only introduced in the matter of the forbidden fruit, and
man could not have been created mortal if God forewarned him against transgressing His
command. Rather, mortality and physical and moral corruptions were introduced through evil
(sin). As the Scripture says, “For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life
through Christ Jesus our Lord.” (Rom. 6:23) Furthermore, Scripture teaches us that sin came into
our world “through one man, and death through sin, and death came to all men,” having inherited
sinful nature and death from Adam, their progenitor (Rom. 5:12). If the first man had not sinned,
he would not have tasted corruption and death and would not have lost his glorified state. For
example, when the Scripture talks of the absence of death and suffering in the eschaton (Rev.
21:4), and the glorified saints becoming “the priests of God and Christ” in the New Millennial
Dispensation (Rev. 20:6), man is only being restored to the state he was before he sinned when
he was not only God’s priest and never tasted death, but was also the royal vice-regent of God.
116
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Thus, it was the loss of the intended state of man that necessitated the new creation
whereby God had to send His only begotten Son, our Lord Jesus, to restore the lost glory and to
restore man to his glorified state (Gen. 3:15). Therefore, the glorified state is not something new
that God is giving to man. It is the outcome of the redemption and the restoration of man to his
lost state of glory and perfection by Christ Jesus. We are therefore unable to agree with Feinberg
that God intended to create and indeed created non-glorified human beings. However, human
beings currently exists in non-glorified bodies, and, to that extent, one can say that Feinberg’s
theistic defense, based on the non-glorified body of man in his current state of being, is
validatable. However, our contention is that it was not the intention of God to create man in a
non-glorified state and He never did.
On how human beings descended into sin, Feinberg relies on “desire” to move forward
his defense to the point that he can introduce evil (sin) and walk it to that point that he can
explain why God is not responsible for evil and why existence of God is consistent with
existence of evil. It must be noted here that Feinberg is not speaking to how sin entered the
world, thus, his neglecting of the concept of Original Sin. Rather, what he set out to do is to
explain the ontological constituents of man responsible for churning out evil.
Trying not to use incompatibilistic free will defense (since he is a compatibilist); he relies
on James 1: 13-15 to prove that desire, which translates into intention, choice, and subsequently
action, is responsible for evil or sin. We have explained above Feinberg’s thinking on how
desire becomes evil as a result of enticement that results in man being “drawn away” to such a
point as to “choose to disobey God.” Therefore, we will not repeat ourselves here. What we
intend to say here is that Feinberg’s pronouncement on this matter is clearly in consonance with
Apostle James teaching in James 1:13-15. Therefore, we agree with Feinberg assertion that
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desire, if not handled properly, can lead to corruption and evil. This is also in accord with
Christ’s teaching about man being defiled not by what goes inside of him, but by what wells up
inside him (Mat. 15:11, 17-20; Mark 7:15, 18-23). We will now examine the epistemic
adequacy of Feinberg theistic defense against tragic moral evil.

Epistemic Adequacy
The evidential argument from evil against theism boils down to its epistemic adequacy.
Can evil, based on induction and probabilistic reasoning, be real evidence against God? If the
atheist succeeds in advancing incontrovertible evidence against theism, then he must have
proven his case. However, how objective and real are evidences derived on the bases of
induction and probability? If the atheist’s proposition or hypothesis fails, then Feinberg, as well
as other theistic defenders or theodicists, would have succeeded in debunking the evidential
problem of evil. In this section, we shall speak to the nature of induction and probability to see if
they can be objectively used to validate the atheist’s argument from evil against theism. We
shall also endeavor to analyze epistemologically and existentially Feinberg’s offensive strategy
against atheistic argument from evil with a view to validating its adequacy.
As already aforementioned, the atheists’ evidential problem from evil derives from the
proposition that it is most improbable that an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving God
exists in the face of evil. The evidential problem, simply put, can be stated as follows:
1.

An all-powerful and all-loving God (G), if He exists, would eliminate evil (E)

2.

E exists

3.

So, G does not exist.
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Statement 1 is the assumption. Statement 2 is the premise while statement 3 is the conclusion.
As noted by Feinberg, one of the problems with inductive argument of this type is that it cannot
be validated. Unlike deductive argument, the premise of inductive argument may be true while
the conclusion is inaccurate. Obviously, E exists, but how does one come to the conclusion that
G does not exist on the basis of E? Could G have had good and valid reasons for allowing E? If
there are valid good reasons why G allows E to exist, then the reliability of the conclusion will
be put in jeopardy. Generally, inductive arguments of the atheistic type lack reliability that
deductive arguments have.
A major problem with the atheistic inductive argument, which is also acknowledged by
Feinberg, is its problem with “hypothesis confirmation or disconfirmation.” Such arguments
appeal only to incidences of evil with no discernible empiricism, or how those incidences relate
to God. From our example above, statement 1 is a conditional statement designed to link a
hypothetical proposition to a conclusion that is not empirically and evidentially conclusive. The
only form of empirical data presented is usually the second statement that appeals to evil, which
unfortunately is not evaluable; neither does it reveal the relationship between the observed
instances of evil and theism. Like Feinberg points out, any relationship between God and evil is
revealed through conceptual argumentation, making the atheists’ case “highly inferential.”
According to Feinberg, “the project becomes even more complicated when one realizes that
empirical data beyond those marshaled by the argument appear to disconfirm the argument’s
conclusion, rather than to confirm it.”117
Furthermore, Feinberg demonstrates how subjective inductive argument from evil is;
depending on how one formulates or constructs the argument. For example, the presence of evil
can mean many different things. According to Feinberg, based on the existence of evil, one of
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the following can be hypothesized, if a linkage to God is being established, God does not exist;
there is a malevolent God; there is an ineffective, but compassionate God; or there is an allpowerful and all-loving God who has sufficiently good reason for allowing evil to exist. Now,
each of the above is probable but all cannot be true the same time. However, we do not know
which one is true. What we know is that the truth of one will preclude the validity of some or all
of the others. Also, there can be some other possible relationship between evil and God, so that
it will be disingenuous to claim that only one possible relationship exists between evil and God.
Obviously, we cannot make a prima facie case against God on the basis of an evidence that can
be interpreted in many different ways. Thus, the atheists’ inductive argument is susceptible to
the danger of subjectivism and conjectural anomaly.
Another valid point made by Feinberg is the atheist’s habitual necessity of linking
instances of evil with God, and not with man. Given that the linkage between evil and God is
not observable while one can observe the correlation between evil and man, why not establish
that linkage with man, rather than with God? If humans are observed to be perpetrating evil,
what is the rationale for the linkage between God and evil? It is obvious that a link between man
and evil can be easily established, although it does not follow that such a link will have a unique
outcome or possibility. Just like one can draw various inferences from the atheistic argument
from evil against theism, so also it is possible to have various propositions about the relationship
of evil to man. However, such relationships are not only directly observable, but can be backed
up with empirical data, which will allow one to identify the appropriate relationship between
man and evil. However, the atheistic argument against God using evil as evidence is a different
kettle of fish, which, right from the beginning, is problematic because of the various problems
with inductive arguments of that type.
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Finally on the epistemic adequacy of the atheistic case involving inductive argument,
Feinberg questions the rationale of atheists accepting the logicality and rationality of theism with
respect to evil, only to turn around, at the evidential level, that the very existence of evil provides
”strong evidence” against theism. Wouldn’t that amount to argumentative double-talk (talking
from both sides of one’s mouth), whereby an argument that has been used to reach a different
conclusion is now being resurrected to support a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to and
a negation of the initial conclusion. According to Feinberg, “when an atheist admits that a
theist’s defense can join without contradiction the existence of God, and the existence of evil, it
seems that a stronger inferential case can be made for the view that an omnipotent, all-loving
God exists who has a morally sufficient reason for evil than for the view that there is no God.”
We therefore concur with Feinberg that the atheist’s case is epistemically inadequate
from the point of view of both logic and induction. While the atheist can mount an inductive
argument against God, it is very doubtful that he can succeed in the light of the problems with
such inductive arguments already highlighted above. By using Feinberg’s view as basis for
rejecting the epistemic adequacy of the atheistic argument from evil, we are able to establish the
soundness and adequacy of Feinberg’s defense epistemologically.
On probabilistic arguments, we have said a lot about it in the previous chapter. We will
only present a summary assessment here for lack of space. Many theologians, including
Feinberg, believe that the atheists’ probability argument is lacking in several ways, one of which
is the inability to assess the total body of evidence that is pertinent to the theory. Even, if one
were to concede that the existence of evil reduces theistic probability, it would still be farfetched
to conclude that theism is improbable.
Perhaps, the major problem with probabilistic argument from evil has to do with lack of
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unanimity between atheologians and theologians on the true values of the prior (a priori) and
posterior (a posteriori) probabilities. The probability of a given occurrence or event is calculated
using Bayes Theorem. Since the numerical values assigned to the various elements of Bayes
Theorem in the atheologian probability argument from evil is highly subjective, it proves
nothing.
Aligned to this problem of subjective assignment of numerical value to the elements of
Bayes Theorem is the lack of agreement between theologians and atheologians as to what
constitute “background knowledge” (a priori), and “evidence” supportive of a proposition.
According to Feinberg, as much as the theists would like to present as evidence the “traditional
theistic proofs as background knowledge” about theism, it is most unlikely that any atheist would
agree to that. This lack of agreement coupled with other points already made, makes it very
difficult for either party to mount a successful probabilistic argument either for or against theism.
However, the burden of proof is on the atheists; thus, there failure in this regard is a victory for
theism.
Although, the rebuttals of inductive and probabilistic atheistic arguments from evil are
not original to Feinberg, he nevertheless makes reasonable contributions to the discussion that
one can attest to the adequacy of his rebuttative arguments. Additionally, he advances some
reasons why God cannot eradicate evil without compromising His stated objective of creating
non-glorified humans. Although, we disagree with Feinberg on his assertion that man was
created non-glorified, we do concede to and agree with him that man, in his current state, is nonglorified, and that although God might be able to remove evil in one of the several ways
Feinberg has identified (highlighted in Chapter 3 of this thesis), He cannot not do so without
jeopardizing His stated objectives and goals.
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On a final note, we conclude that although Feinberg’s defense is cohesive, it could have
been made in a much easier and straightforward manner, if he was in a position to appeal to
incompatibilistic free will. His appeal to desire, necessitated by his compatibilistic Modified
Rationalism, makes for an expansive discussion on the price of utopia. All those discussions
about the various ways God could eradicate evil by eradicating desires or various stages of the
transformation of desire into action seem totally extraneous and not the kind of thing one would
expect an omnipotent and omniscient God to do. Rearranging people’s life just to ensure that
they do not actualize evil is not an efficient way of dealing with the situation. If God had wanted
to eradicate evil, he could have done that in a way that will not involve the chaos that Feinberg
identified. After all, that is what God has done in the life of true believers, who have been
transformed through the power of the Holy Ghost and their faith in the finished work of Christ
by the renewing of their minds (Rom. 12:2).
Furthermore, isn’t Feinberg contradicting himself by trying to show different ways God
could eliminate desire and thereby evil, after he has argued that God did not have to eradicate
evil because He had good reasons for allowing it? If God did not have to eradicate evil, why go
into such dramatic and goring details about how dysfunctional life would be if evil was to be
eradicated in any of the ways Feinberg identified? It is obvious that genuine believers who have
learned to operate under the power of the Holy Spirit have more peaceful lives and minds than
those that operate under the power of the ruler of this world, and they are able to transcend the
temptation of evil. Perhaps, recognizing the libertarian free will as a valued good, which cannot
be abridged without being sacrificed in order to eradicate evil, would have made for easier
presentation. Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is a much easier proposition. That
notwithstanding, Feinberg’s theistic defense is coherently and evidentially sound enough to
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qualify as a successful defense.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Evil has consistently been part of human existence since the Original Fall and has been
playing an important role in the divine economy. The problem of evil has tasked the minds of
theologians and religious philosophers from time immemorial. The controversy of theodicy is
no longer restricted to a discussion between believers (theists) and non-believers (non-theists)
but in the real sense, the most controversial and heated discussions on this issue are taking place
among theists, especially between theologians who hold libertarian or incompatibilistic view of
God’s sovereignty and human freedom, and those who hold the compatibilistic view. This
development accounts for the plethora of literature on this topic and the diverse arguments and
theistic systems that try to harmonize the problem of evil with the all-powerful and benevolent
God. Each of these rival theistic systems sees God in different perspective.
However, the purpose of this thesis was not to evaluate the different theistic systems or to
be bugged down by the specificity of the various atheistic arguments from evil against theism.
Rather, our purpose was to evaluate Feinberg’s theistic defense against the problem of evil on the
basis of its internal consistency, exegetical accuracy, and epistemic adequacy. On the basis of
our evaluation, we were able to establish that although we might not be able to agree with
Feinberg’s theology as a result of the differences in our theological beliefs, nevertheless,
Feinberg’s defense of theism against atheistic arguments from evil constitutes a coherent and
probable resolution of the problem of tragic moral evil. Although, Feinberg will not call his
defense a theodicy simply because he claims that he was not privy to God’s reasons for allowing
evil which, in the true sense, is what theodicy is about, nevertheless, we believe that those that
call their resolutions of the problem of evil a theodicy were also not privy to God’s decisions or
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reasons. Therefore, we will not be far fetching to assert that Feinberg’s resolution or theistic
defense against the problem of tragic moral evil measures up to a coherent and sound theodicy.
Before arriving at that conclusion, we presented in Chapter 1 the statement of purpose
and position of the thesis, as well as, the limitations and the methodology of the study. In
Chapter 2, we embarked on a theological and philosophical review of the problem of evil. We
defined evil and explained the multidimensionality of the problem of evil: the logical problem
that deals with the rationality of thesis, the evidential problem that deals with the probability of
theism, and the religious problem that deals with the livability of theism. We then explored the
concepts of free will, moral responsibility, and soft determinism from a compatibilist’s
perspective. However, in doing that, we were able to highlight the various arguments for and
against compatibilism. Such arguments include Consequence Argument, and the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities (PAP). We also presented a general overview of how contemporary
Modified Rationalists see the problem of evil.
In Chapter 3, we presented Feinberg’s theodicy (or defense, as he prefers to call it),
highlighting his theological belief as a moderate Calvinist with compatibilistic metaphysics. We
also presented his theistic system as a Calvinistic version of Modified Rationalism with a nonconsequential ethic. We then presented Feinberg’s defense against the logical problem of evil as
the background to his theistic defense against the evidential problem of tragic moral evil. In the
defense against the logical problem of evil, we highlighted Feinberg’s three-stage defense: the
nature of man, causation of sin and moral responsibility for sin, and what he called “the price of
utopia.” In presenting Feinberg’s defense of the evidential problem from evil, we highlighted his
arguments against induction and probability as they apply to evidential arguments of the sort
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raised by atheists. We also presented his arguments on the limitation of human knowledge, as
well as, his defense against the problems of gratuitous evil and quantity of evil.
In Chapter 4, we evaluated John Feinberg’s theodicy on tragic moral evil on the basis of
its internal consistency, exegetical accuracy and epistemic adequacy. Although, we do not agree
with Feinberg’s theology and philosophical metaphysic, we were not able to fault the internal
consistency of his defense with his theology. We also evaluated his defense on the basis of
exegetical accuracy. Here we have a few disagreements with him with regard to God’s intention
in creating man and whether man was created with a non-glorified body in a morally imperfect
state. However, our disagreements do not invalidate his arguments or the soundness of his
defense. We also evaluated Feinberg’s defense on the basis of epistemic adequacy, and it is our
considered opinion that he successfully discredited the atheologian arguments from evil against
theism, and, therefore, his defense is epistemically adequate.
It is also the conclusion of this paper that the existence of evil does not negate in any way
the omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence of God; neither does it make God to be
malevolent nor impotent. Rather, the existence of evil is a logical and necessary outcome of the
doctrines of God’s sovereignty and human freedom, the transcendence, and the righteousness of
God. Furthermore, the existence of evil and its manifestation in pain and suffering has a purpose
in the divine economy and that human beings can experience justice only by developing personal
and intimate relationships with God. God operates out of His sovereignty as a gracious God and
that rather than hold God responsible for the effects of evil, the culpability should be laid at the
doorsteps of moral agents (humans and Satan). However, no matter how much Satan tries, he
cannot negate the eternal plan of God for man’s salvation and redemption, which God already
sealed with the atoning death of His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ. Satan and his evil works
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shall be utterly destroyed through Jesus Christ’s redeeming sacrifice. By having a loving
relationship with God, man is able to overcome evil with good and have hope of blissful
existence in the new world to come.

The Central Issue: Sovereignty of God, Human Freedom, and Creatural Responsibility
The existence of God is taken for granted in the Scripture as no direct effort was made to
prove it. However, several passages point to His works declaring His glory. The Scripture
speaks about God’s attributes. He is revealed as being holy, which refers to His absolute majesty
and ethical holiness. This attribute of holiness, a communicable attribute of God, provides a
model for emulation by humanity and a glimpse of God’s plan for mankind. God is also shown
to be omnibenevolent (supreme good),118 while human goodness should be representative of His
divine goodness.119 The Scripture also speaks to God’s omnipotence: an Almighty and Selfsufficient God.120 His almightiness is revealed in His creative work,121 the works of nature,122
His immanence in history,123 his miracles and wonders,124 his power over death,125 and his
redemptive work.126 All these point to an infinitely powerful God who sustains His creation and
accomplishes His divine purposes through His awesome and limitless power. How then does one
explain the existence of evil, if God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent?
According to the Scripture, God created heaven and earth and everything therein. The
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awesomeness of God is declared daily by His works and his relationship with man, the jewel of
His earthly creation. In creating man, God created him in His own image and after His own
likeness.127 Man was created with unique ability to reason, to be imaginative and self-conscious,
relational both with God and self, and was endowed with outstanding spirituality to decipher
right from wrong, just from unjust, and to promote universal harmony in accordance to God’s
holistic standard. As a rational creature, God gives man the freedom of choice and holds him
accountable for his choices. If the Bible took for granted the existence of God, it definitely has a
lot to say about His relationship with his highest earthly creation, human beings. The Bible
teaches God’s transcendence (contrary to pantheism) and His immanence (contrary to deistic
beliefs).128 God is also portrayed as a personal being and not a First Cause or Force. He related
with Adam in the garden in a personal way and with the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as
well as, Moses, Elijah and many other scriptural personalities.
In accordance with His omnibenevolence, God honored man and provided him with the
nurturing environment he needed to thrive. Everything was placed at his disposal and he was
given dominion over all God’s creation. The only demand of God is man’s obedience: for him to
exercise his free will in a way that would promote harmony and glorify God. However, man, in
exercising his freewill and under the deceit of the Serpent, disobeyed God and was placed under
curse. Thus, evil and its manifestation in pain and suffering were introduced into human
existence as a result of Adam’s transgression and the resultant curse. Could God have prevented
Adam’s transgression? Absolutely! After all, God, the omniscient and omnipotent, would have
known that Adam would disobey and could have prevented it. However, God was never bound
to save Adam from his choices nor prevent him from making bad judgment. Having been
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instructed in holiness and having been given moral capacity to do good, Adam by his choice
could not have expected anything other than fierce condemnation and recompense for his
disobedience. However, God, in His omnibenevolent manner, showed mercy on Adam in
judgment and not only covered up his nakedness but also made provision for man’s redemption
through the atoning death of His only begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ.129
This speaks to the issue of God’s sovereignty in relation to man’s free will. There are
two polarizing philosophical views on this topic. On one end, there is the deterministic
philosophical view of absolute sovereignty of God, while on the other, there is a God rendered
impotent by man’s free moral agency. These two extremities have shaped discussions on
theodicy. It appears there is nothing in-between. God is either all controlling over human
thoughts, actions and events or He has completely washed His hands off his creation or He is
limited (incapable) of affecting anything that goes on. The proponents of absolute sovereignty of
God would argue that God is fully immanent in creation; that He orders all things in accordance
with the immutable counsel of His own will,130 including the will and actions of man,131 and
every event in the universe;132 productive and destructive, “on a moment-to-moment basis”133 On
the other extreme, God is seen to have abandoned his creation to follow its own course,134 giving
up His sovereignty and allowing free moral agency and natural laws to prevail. These two
extreme views of God’s relationship with His creature can only present distorted ideas about the
true nature of God’s relationship with the world He created.
The Scripture says that God is both transcendent and immanent. God does not abdicate
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His responsibility; neither is He limited by man’s free will nor by natural or moral laws. At the
same time, He does not rule by fiat over the affairs of man. As the just Supreme Being, God
cannot perform criminality but exercises His sovereignty as He wishes. He said that He would
have mercy on whom He would have mercy. In this regard, God can exercise providential
control whenever He deems it necessary by directing the actions of specific people to accomplish
his objectives. While man is finite, limited, and mortal, God is infinite, unlimited and immortal.
God is above all natural and moral laws and thus, can be said to possess absolute freedom and
sovereignty to do as He pleases. Having granted man free moral agency which, by the way, is
according to His purpose, He cannot always intervene when humans beings decide to exercise
that freedom just because that decision is not in His best interest. To do so will negate the gift of
freedom of choice He freely gave to mankind.
Furthermore, if God were to intervene each time somebody was going to utilize his free
will wrongly then God would be nothing more than a puppet master or a bully, browbeating
everyone into submission. God’s sovereignty is exercised in just and holy manner in order not to
descend into the decadence of those agents He is trying to bring into obedience. God, the only
wise and all-powerful God, cannot be seen to be a puppet master or a bully. He is just always.
Did God purposely create or set man up to fall? Our answer is no! If God had wanted to
create a fallible man, why would He had created him in His own image, after His own likeness,
and given Him dominion over everything He had created? Obviously God’s intention in creating
man was not to make him fall; otherwise He would not have made him the jewel of His creation
with volitional and imaginative capacity. Was man destined to fall? Absolutely not! Was there
the possibility of man falling? Absolutely yes! But, when does possibility translate to actuality?
To argue that man was destined to fall is to say that God deliberately made a faulty design of
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man and sacrificed His only begotten Son for no just cause. It would also mean that God, after
all, is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. He would also be morally reprehensible and not the
loving God we believers know Him to be, if He would sacrifice His son for a deliberately faulty
design that should not have been and could have been corrected otherwise. However, we know
that God is competent in all ways and supremely loving. Thus, God did not deliberately create a
faulty man; neither did He make mistake in His design of man. God created the man He wanted
to create for His own purpose. Therefore, man’s falling had nothing to do with his design, but
with man’s misuse of his freedom.
Now, if God did not deliberately create man to fall, but he (man) fell anyway, what does
it say about the omnipotence and omniscience of God? Well, to answer this question, one has to
adopt a notion of divine omnipotence that is consistent with our assertion. In this regard, we
believe that God created human beings and the world that are logically consistent with his divine
purpose. We believe that the divine purpose of God was to create humans that would be
volitional in their decision to relate consciously with Him without any compulsion or coercion.
For that reason, he gave man free will. However, because man has to be fully volitional in his
relationship with God, it became imperative that man must be given the capacity to choose his
path in life: whether to have a loving and respectful relationship with God or not. If God’s
purpose, which was to create a volitional man, was fulfilled, then God is omnipotent. For
example, if an inventor produces a machine to grind corn, and the machine functions the way it
is designed, then the inventor has done his job. It will not matter that the machine cannot grind
stone. If the inventor had wanted to produce a machine that could grind stone, then he would
have had to change his invention. God created the kind of man He wanted to create for his own
purpose.
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It is our believe that God, having the rebellion of Satan in mind, wanted man to prove
himself in obedience to a simple command concerning the forbidden fruit. Man was instructed
in righteousness, having been told the consequence of eating the forbidden fruit. Now, could God
have known that man was going to fall anyway since He is omniscient? One would expect that
He would. However, He would still be justified to create the kind of man He created given His
divine purpose. Let us remember that, according to our own thinking, God’s purpose was to
create human beings who would love Him freely out of their own free will and volition without
any coercion. Could man not have made the right choices by obeying God? After all, the
Scripture says, “If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land.”135 The outcome
of man’s disobedience is evil and the consequential pain and suffering. If man could do
whatever he likes without repercussions, what kind of anarchy are we going to have? So, if God
decided to correct man with pain and suffering as deterrents unto others and to reinforce in them
the need to do good, how can one blame God? After all, God disciplines those He loves.136
We, therefore, believe that man bears moral responsibility for the activation of evil in our
world and God cannot be faulted in this matter. Should God have given man free will knowing
by foreknowledge that he would misuse it? Well, to answer the question, let us ask another
question: does a father stop his child, who is learning to walk, from taking that first step even
though, in all probability, the father knows that the child will most likely fall? Rather, the father
stands right there behind the child; ready to scoop him up if he falls, and encouraging him until
he gets it right. If he does not fall, the father beams with pride for his child’s accomplishment.
Should the father have held the child back and prevented him from taking that step which in all
probability would make him fall? The answer is no, because if that child was not allowed to rise

135
136

Is. 1:19.
Prov. 3:12.

92

and fall, he would never learn the way of life. Throughout his adolescent life, the child, under
guidance of his parents, navigates the issues of life, making mistakes as he progresses, but also
learning from those mistakes. Now, some of us might say that this is simplistic and out of
comparison with the devastating effects evil has had on man. However, how many parents have
cautioned their children about playing with fire, and if they are burnt, empathize with them, but
still tell them “I told you so?”
Also, there are probably a few parents who love their children to death, but will still
allow them to take life-threatening risks such as bungee jumping. Could the parent have
imposed his or her will on the son especially if the son was of legal age, and prevented him from
bungee jumping just because he knew by foreknowledge that his son would get hurt? All the
father could do was to warn him against bungee jumping, but if the son refused to heed his father
warning and was injured or killed, it would not be the father’s fault. Even if the father had the
power to force his son not to engage in risky lifestyle, he would be impinging on the son’s legal
and God-given rights to make decision on his own, if the son was of legal age. Just as the father,
God did all that was necessary, short of imposing His will on His errant creature, in warning him
of the consequences of utilizing his free will contrary to the purpose it was designed for. If one
lights a candle and sees his young child trying to touch the candlelight, he will warn the child
about the danger of the fire and try to protect the child. However, if the child continues to ignore
the warnings of his parents, the parent might be justify to let the child put his finger into the
candle flame knowing fully that once burnt on the finger, he would learn his lesson. As Kelly
Clarkson’s song says “What doesn’t kill you will make you stronger.”137 Sometimes, people
need to pass through harrowing experiences in order to become strong. As Paul also says “And
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not only this, but we also exult in our tribulations, knowing that tribulation brings about
perseverance; and perseverance, proven character; and proven character, hope; and hope does not
disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out within our hearts through the Holy
Spirit who was given to us.”138
Therefore, the existence of evil does not make the existence of God improbable. God has
genuine and acceptable reasons for allowing evil. If God had wanted to eradicate evil, He would
have done that, if that were His only purpose. However, if God wants to preserve His other
purposes such as free will, soul-building or non-glorified human beings, He cannot not eradicate
evil at the same time. Also, in the final section of this thesis, we shall show that evil plays an
important role in the divine economy, and that it is an outcome of man’s disobedience. We shall
now offer an eschatological and Christological resolution that involves a morally and physically
perfect world.

A Morally Perfect World: An Eschatological and Christological Resolution
A concept central to the Christian belief is that of the eschaton, an eschatological
dispensation that heralds the final heaven-like existence for the redeemed. In that dispensation,
pain, suffering, death, and sorrow will be no more (Rev. 21:4). This eschatological expectation
forms the basis of Christian belief. For example, Paul, writing on resurrection and God’s
dispensation for the end time states: “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men
most miserable…. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.”139 Thus,
Christians believe that no matter the afflictions and sufferings that they might pass through in
this world, no matter the evil they might have to endure in our current world, a glorious period of
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blissful existence comes when the children of God will finally triumph over evil and be in the
presence of God forever.
It has been stated above that the fall of man changed his state of being, resulting in his
being separated from God. Evil gradually permeated human’s existence so much so “that every
imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually,” and that it grieved God’s
heart that He had created man (Gen. 6:5-6). Evil desires replaced good intentions. With such
ontological changes in man, one could also expect the natural orders and laws to have changed
also. For once, we know that the ground (earth) was cursed for Adam’s sake: things were no
longer the way God had designed them, and man was now destined to die (Gen. 3:17-19). Evil,
with its attendant effects, was introduced into the world.. Human soul was corrupted and Adam
was no longer capable of enjoying the presence of God that he had to hide himself when He
heard the LORD in the garden (Gen. 3:10). Man became fearful, and with fear came insecurity
and the development of survival instinct that only accentuated evil. Moral perversion gradually
took over so much that it became human’s second nature. With changes in man and nature, the
world was no longer the way it was designed. Just like the image of God was marred and
fractured, the world took a devastating turn and was no longer the same.
However, God, not wanting His creature to be lost completely, made plan for the
restoration of the original order in a more glorious manner than ever before. God, in
pronouncing judgment, instituted a redemption plan than involves His only begotten Son, our
Lord Jesus Christ (Gen. 3:15). With this plan, the corrupted order (the Old Creation) will be
replaced with a new order (New Creation) in which the eternal glorious plan of God for the jewel
of His creation (man) will be fulfilled. Through Adam, all men have sinned (Rom. 3:23), but
through Christ, man has been given the gift of life again (Rom. 6:23). As the Scripture says,
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without blood there is no remission of sin (Heb. 9:22). Jesus, the sinless Son of the Most High,
had to pay the ransom with His atoning blood.
The implication is that since it was the first Adam who transgressed and fractured the
image of God, it would take another sinless Adam to restore the image (I Cor. 15:20; Rom.
5:19). In order to restore the fractured image of God to its original perfect state, the kingship and
priesthood of mankind had to be restored through a new creation, which is in Christ. Israel was
chosen as the medium for the realization of the stated objective of redeeming mankind back into
grace and restoring the original perfection that was lost at Eden. All that was lost in the creation
is being restored through the new creation. Jesus is the new and last Adam, who is also celestial,
and through whom believers are already enjoying the experience of the new creation.
The new world will be morally perfect in the sense that all the sources of corruption and
evil would have been completely annihilated. Death would have been vanquished; Satan and his
hosts shall have their portion in the burning lake of fire. The natural order would have been
transformed to reflect the spiritual order that would be incorruptible. Also, only those who have
been redeemed through faith in the efficacious and atoning blood of Christ will be the citizens of
the new world, and they will be priests of God and of Christ Jesus (Rev. 20; 21).
In conclusion, Jesus, by His death and resurrection, instituted a new creation that will not
only restore all that was lost in the Garden of Eden by Adam, but will surpass it in its beauty and
elegance. Although, believers have started enjoying the vestige of this new creation, the fullness
of it shall not come until the second advent of Jesus Christ when New Jerusalem (a more
perfected and glorious paradise than Eden) descends out of heaven from God: for the old earth
shall pass away (Rev. 21:1 – 4). The tabernacle of God shall be with men again and God
Himself will dwell among men. However, the perfect new world would not come until all
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mankind have been given the opportunity to receive the good news of our Lord Jesus Christ. For
this reason, believers are commissioned to go into all the nooks and crannies of the world to
make disciples, baptizing and teaching them about God and His precepts (Mat. 28:19). Believers
who have been grafted into the natural olive tree of adoption (Rom. 11:24) cannot afford to fail
the Great Commission of Christ as the natural branch (the Israelites) failed their priestly and
holiness responsibilities.

A Final Biblical Exegesis: Genesis 3:15 and I King 18: 24-40
Evil has plagued human existence since the Great Fall and has been playing an important
role in the divine economy. Evil, in every form and shape, is the antithesis between the children
of God and the children of the devil, which was ordained by God when he pronounced judgment
on the serpent for beguiling Adam and Eve to disobey God. In that passage, God said, “And I
will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise
thy head, and thou shall bruise his heel.”140 This passage which is often referred to as the first
proclamation of the gospel of salvation (protoevangelium) is also the spiritual antithesis between
the seed of the woman (children of God or, more specifically, Jesus Christ)141 and the seed of the
serpent (the children of Satan),142 which was intentionally and sovereignly imposed by God as
judicial curse and as a proclamation of God’s plan for man’s salvation. It is in this antipathy that
the true meaning of God’s salvation plan should be understood. Thus, evil is a necessary and
integral part of human existence designed to reveal God’s glory in adversity, to move His
agenda, and establish the fact that human beings can experience justice only by developing
140

Gen. 3:15
See Galatians 3:16,29
142
cf. John 8:44, Psalm 58:3
141

97

personal and intimate relationships with God.
According to the Scripture, Satan and mankind, in exercising their free will run contrary
to God’s instructions while God, exercising His sovereignty, manages the circumstances to bring
about His define purpose. The story of Elijah and the prophets of Baal (I King 18: 24-40) is a
great example of how good triumphs over evil and how children of God prevail over the children
of the devil. In the story we see how Elijah, the prophet of the Most High, was able to prevail
over hundreds of Baal’s prophets. He alone stood against an apostate kingdom and prevailed
because he served the true God. By challenging the prophets of Baal to a show of power, Elijah
was able to demonstrate that Yahweh is the only true God. The name of God was glorified
because all the people acknowledged that Jehovah (Yahweh) is the true God. Even Ahab
acknowledged that the God of Elijah was truly great as the only God who could answer by fire.
The story of Elijah standing in opposition to the prophets of Baal also demonstrates the
importance of God-ward perspective in conflict. Under an evil but powerful king, the worship of
Jehovah was outlawed and all the prophets of God were pursued even into the darkest holes and
caves until all of them were annihilated except for Elijah who God preserved over the years until
the battle of the gods on Mount Carmel. Against all odds, children of God are not to despair but
to persevere and endure because, in the final analysis, “it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of
righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby.”143 Elijah had to endure hardship and
persecution. He had to run away from a wicked king and his queen who were determined to
finish him off, just like they did to the other prophets. However, God’s plan was to turn
everything around unto His glory. He kept Elijah for those years of his trouble, making sure he
never lacked even when the children of the devil were already receiving the recompense of their
wicked ways. The Bible tells us that throughout the three years of drought, Elijah was well taken
143
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care off. God, in the time of adversity, is always there for His own children no matter the
situation. He says that “When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee; and through
the river, they shall not overflow thee: when thou walkest through the fire, thou shall not be
burned, neither shall the flame kindle against thee.”144 Elijah was kept until his hour of glory
when God was truly glorified before the people.
God’s ability to turn evil to good confirms the superiority of God over evil. God, in
revealing the Excellency of His power and goodness of His character, occasionally mitigates the
scope and intensity of evil engendered by sinful behaviors of free moral agents. Satan, having
caused the downfall of man at the Garden of Eden, thought he had put asunder God’s plan for
mankind. However, God revealed His supremacy when He declared, while cursing the serpent,
that the seed of the woman would bruise Satan’s head. That seed of the woman is Jesus Christ
who, as the incarnate of the living God, suffered and died in paying the wages of sin and set free
all that are in the bondage of sin. The death and resurrection of Christ Jesus creates an awesome
opportunity for mankind’s regeneration and redemption into the perfectness of God and the
ultimate annihilation of Satan, evil, pain and suffering in the Lake of Fire that burns with
brimstone and sulfur.

144

Is. 43:2, KJV

99

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Marilyn McCord. Horrendous Evil and the Goodness of God. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999.
Alden, Robert. Job. New American Commentary, vol. 11. Nashville: Broadman & Holman,
1993.
Alston, William. "Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom."
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18, no. 1/2 (January 1985): 19-32.
Arminius, Jacobus. “A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination.” In The Writings of James
Arminius. Translated by James Nichols and W. R. Bagnall. 3 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker,
1956.
Atkinson, David John, David Field, Arthur Frank Holmes, and Oliver O’Donnovan. New
Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1995.
Basinger, David. "Divine Omniscience and the Soteriological Problem of Evil: Is the Type of
Knowledge God Possesses Relevant?” Religious Studies 28, no. 1 (March 1992): 1-18.
______. "Divine Persuasion: Could the Process God do More?" Journal of Religion 64, no.3
(July 1984): 332-47.
______. Divine Power in Process Theism: A Philosophical Critique. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1988.
______ and Randall Basinger. "Divine Omnipotence: Plantinga vs. Griffin." Process Studies 11
(Spring 1981): 11-24.
Basinger, Randall. "Exhaustive Divine Sovereignty: A Practical Critique." In The Grace of God
and the Will of Man, edited by Clark Pinnock, 191-205. Minneapolis, MN: Bethany
House, 1989.
Baugh, S. M. "The Meaning of Foreknowledge." In The Grace of God, The Bondage of the Will,
ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, 183-200. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.
Bavinck, Herman. God and Creation. Edited by John Bolt. Translated by John Vriend.
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004.
Begg, Alistair. The Hand of God: Finding His Care in All Circumstances. Chicago: Moody
Press, 1999.
Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 2000.

100

Blocher, Henri. Evil and the Cross. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994.
Boice, James Montgomery. Foundations of the Christian Faith. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1986.
Boyd, Gregory. God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1997.
_____. Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001.
Brannan, Daniel K. “Darwinism and Original Sin: Frederick R. Tennant’s Analysis of the
Church Fathers’ Understanding of Original Sin and an Exegesis of St. Paul” Journal for
Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science 8 (January 2011): 139-171.
Bridges, Jerry. "Does Divine Sovereignty Make a Difference in Everyday Life?" In The Grace of
God, The Bondage of the Will, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, 203-14.
Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995.
_____. Trusting God. Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 1988.
Brightman, Edgar S. A Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1940.
Calvin, John. The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of the Orthodox Doctrine of
Human Choice Against Pighius. Edited by A. N. S. Lane. Translated by G. I. Davis.
Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996.
_____. Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by
Ford Lewis Battles. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006.
Carson, Donald A. Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in
Tension. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1994.
_____. How Long, O Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker,
2006.
Chrzan, Keith. "Necessary Gratuitous Evil: An Oxymoron Revisited." Faith and Philosophy 11,
no.1 (January 1994): 131-35.
Clark, David W. “Voluntarism and Rationalism in the Ethics of Ockham,” Franciscan Studies 31
(1971): 72-87.
Clark, Gordon H. Religion, Reason and Revelation. Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian & Reformed,
1961.
Clarke, Randolph, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” The Stanford

101

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2000 Edition),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archieves/fall2000/entries/incompatibilism-theories/ (accessed
June 10. 2012).
Cobb, John B. and David Griffin. Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition. Philadelphia,
PA: Westminster Press, 1976.
Cottrell, Jack W. "The Nature of Divine Sovereignty." In The Grace of God and the Will of Man,
edited by Clark Pinnock, 97-119. Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 1989.
Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism:
Omniscience. Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 1991.
_____. The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.
Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987.
_____. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Wheaton, IL: Crossway
Books, 2001.
Cranfield, C. E. B. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.
Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1975.
Dailey, Thomas F. The Repentant Job: A Ricoeurian Icon for Biblical Theology. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1994.
Dhorme, E. A Commentary on the Book of Job. Translated by Harold Knight. London: Thomas
Nelson and Sons, 1967.
Dobson, James C. When God Doesn't Make Sense. Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1993.
Dunning, H. Ray. Grace, Faith, and Holiness. Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1988.
Edwards, Jonathan. The Freedom of the Will. Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1996.
Elliot, Elisabeth. A Path Through Suffering. Ann Arbor, MI: Vine Books, 1990.
Ellison, H. L. From Tragedy to Triumph: The Message of the Book of Job. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1958.
Elwell, Walter A., ed. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2001.
Erickson, Millard. What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? The Current Controversy
over Divine Foreknowledge. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003.
Ezell, Rick. Defining Moments: How God Shapes Our Character through Crisis. Downers

102

Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001.
Feinberg, John S. "God, Freedom, and Evil in Calvinist Thinking." In The Grace of God, The
Bondage of the Will, edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, 459-483. Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 1995.
_____. "God Ordains All Things." In Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine
Sovereignty and Human Freedom, edited by David and Randall Basinger, 19-42.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986.
_____. The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil. Revised and
expanded ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004.
_____. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001.
_____. “Why I Still Believe in Christ, in Spite of Evil and Suffering,” in Why I Am a Christian:
Leading Thinkers Explain Why They Believe, edited by Norman L. Geisler and Paul K. Hoffman,
271-289. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2006.
Fischer, John Martin. “Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane, 281–308. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002
_____. The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Study of Control. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
_____, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Four Views of Free Will. Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
Fisk, Samuel. Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Neptune, NJ: Loizeaux Brothers, 1973.
Flew, Antony, “Compatibilism, Free Will and God,” Philosophy 48, no. 185 (July, 1973): 231244.
_____. “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology,
ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, New York: Macmillan, 1973.
Flint, Thomas P. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998.
Forster, Roger T. and Paul V. Marston. God's Strategy in Human History. Wheaton, IL: Tyndale
House, 1973.
Frankfurt, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66
(1969): 829–839.
Geach, Peter T. God and the Soul, New York: Schoeken, 1969.

103

Geinvett, R. Douglass. Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick’s Theodicy,
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1995.
Geisler, Norman L. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Baker Books,
1999.
Griffin, David. Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1991.
_____. God, Power and Evil; Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1991.
_____. God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1976.
Grudem, Wayne. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994.
Haji, Ishitiyaque, “Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility.” in The Oxford
Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane, 281–308. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Hallett, Garth L. “Evil and Human Understanding,” Heythrop Journal 32, no. 4 (1991): 467-476.
Hasker, William. "Foreknowledge and Necessity." Faith and Philosophy 2 (April 1985), 121138.
_____. "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil." Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 1 (January 1992): 23-35.
_____. "On Regretting Evils of this World." Southern Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 4 (1981):
425-438.
Helm, Paul. "The Augustinian-Calvinist View." In Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited
by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001.
_____. "The Philosophical Issue of Divine Foreknowledge." In The Grace of God, The Bondage
of the Will, edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, 485-497. Grand Rapids:
Baker Books, 1995.
Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
Holme, Tom. “Theodicy Motifs in the New Testament: Response to the Death of Jesus.” In
Theodicy in the World of the Bible, edited by Antti Laato and Johannes C. de Moor, 605–
651. Boston, MA: Brill, 2003.
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: The Posthumous Essays of the
Immortality of the Soul and of Suicide (Parts X) 2nd edition, edited by Richard Pokin.

104

Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998.
Hunt, David P. "Divine Foreknowledge and Simple Foreknowledge." Faith and Philosophy 10
(July 1993): 394-414.
Jennings Jr., Theodore W. “Reconstructing the Doctrine of Sin.” In Other Side of Sin:
Woundedness from the Perspective of the Sinned-Against, edited by Andrew Sung Park
and Susan L. Nelson, 109–122, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001
John, Thompson. "The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami?" Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 49, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 202-204.
Kane, G. Stanley, “The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil,” Religious Studies
11 (1975).
Kane, Robert. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press,
2005.
_____. Free Will and Values. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985.
Kapitan, Tomis. “A Master Argument for Incompatibilism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Free
Will, Robert Kane (ed.) 127-157, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Knight, Douglas. “Time and Persons in the Economy of God.” In Providence of God: Deus
Habet Consilium, edited by Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler, 131-143, New
York: T & T Clark, 2009.
Kushner, Harold S. When Bad Things Happen to Good People. London: Pan Books, 1982.
Langtry, Bruce. “Structures of Greater Good Theodicy: The Objection from Alternative Goods.”
Sophia 37, no. 2 (Sept/Oct 1998): 1–7.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm “The Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil,” Theodicy, trans. E. M.
Huggard, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.
Lewis, C.S. The Problem of Pain. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
_____. The Screwtape Letters. Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1976.
_____. The Weight of Glory. New York: Touchstone, 1996.
Luther, Martin. The Bondage of the Will. Translated by James I. Packer and O. R. Johnson.
London: The Camelot Press, 1957.
Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982

105

Martin, Edward N., “Proper Function, Natural Reason and Evils as Extrinsic Goods,” Global
Journal of Classical Theology 1, no. 1 (Sept. 1998).
Martin, Michael, “Is Evil Evidence Against the Existence of God?” Mind 87, no. 347 ((July
1978): 429-432.
Metzger, Bruce Manning and Michael David Coogan. The Oxford Companion to the Bible.
Oxford, NY: Oxford University, 1993.
McKenna, Michael, “Compatibilism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism/ (accessed July 18,
2012).
Morris, Thomas V. Our Idea of God. Downers Grove: IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991.
Murray, John. Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1960.
O’Connor, David. “On Failing to Resolve Theism-Versus-Atheism Empirically,” Religious
Studies 26, no.1 (1990): 91-102.
Oden, Thomas C. Care of Souls in the Classic Tradition. Edited by Don S. Browning.
Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984.
Ortlund, Raymond C, Jr. "The Sovereignty of God: Case Studies in the Old Testament." In The
Grace of God, The Bondage of the Will, edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A.
Ware, 25-46. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995.
Ostrom, William Bruce. “Divine Sovereignty and the Religious Problem of Evil: An Evaluation
of Evangelical Models.” Ph.D. diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2007.
Palmquist, Stephens. Dreams of Wholeness: A Course of Introductory Lectures on Religion,
Psychology and Personal Growth. Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 1997/2008.
Paul, Kjoss Helseth. "On Divine Ambivalence: Open Theism and The Problem of Particular
Evils." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44, no. 3 (September, 2001): 493 –
511.
Peterson, Michael L. Evil and the Christian God. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1982.
_____. God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues. Oxford: Westview Press, 1998.
_____, ed. The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1992.

106

Picirilli, Robert E. "Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Future." Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 43, no. 2 (2000): 257-271.
Pinnock, Clark. “Clark Pinnock’s Response to John Feinberg” in Predestination and Free Will:
Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, edited by David and Randall
Basinger, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986.
Plantinga, Alvin J. God, Freedom and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1974.
_____. God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. London:
Cornell University Press, 1990.
_____. “The Probabilistic Argument from Evil” Philosophical Studies 35, no. 1 (1979): 2-3.
Reventlow, Henning Graf. “The Evil Ones and the Godless: A Problem of Identity in Biblical
Wisdom.” In The Problem of Evil and Its Symbols in Jewish and Christian Tradition,
edited by Henning Graf Reventlow and Yair Hoffman, 58–67. New York: T & T Clark,
2004.
Reichenbach, Bruce R. Evil and a Good God. New York: Fordham University Press, 1982.
_____. "Freedom, Justice, and Moral Responsibility." In The Grace of God and the Will of Man,
edited by Clark H. Pinnock, 277-99. Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1989.
_____. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 17, no. 3 (July
1980): 221-227.
Reymond, Robert. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Nashville: Thomas
Nelson, 1998.
Rice, Richard. God's Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will. Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House,
1985.
Richardson, Alan and John Stephen Bowden. The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology.
Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1983
Robinson, Michael D. Eternity and Freedom: A Critical Analysis of Divine Timelessness as a
Solution to the Foreknowledge/Free Will Debate. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1995.
Rowe, William L., ed. God and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
_____. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” American Philosophical
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (October 1979): 335-341.
Roy, Steven C. How Much Does God Foreknow? A Comprehensive Biblical Study. Downers

107

Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006.
Schreiner, Thomas R., and Bruce A. Ware, eds. The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will. 2
vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995.
Schwarz, Hans. Evil: A Historical and Theological Perspective. Lima, OH: Academic Renewal
Press, 2001.
Sohn, Hohyun. "The Beauty of Hell? Augustine's Aesthetic Theodicy and its Critics." Theology
Today 64, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 47-57.
Spinoza, Benedictus de. Ethics. Translated by Edwin Curley, London: Penguin Books, 1996.
Stewart, Melville Y. The Greater Good Defense. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Snyder, Daniel T. “Surplus Evil.” Philosophical Quarterly 40, no. 158 (January 1990): 78-86.

Talbot, Layton. Beyond Suffering: Discovering the Message of Job. Greenville, SC: Bob Jones
University Press, 2007.
Trau, Jane Mary, “Fallacies in the Argument from Gratuitous Suffering,” The New Scholasticism
60, no. 4 (1986):485-489.
van Inwagen, Peter, ed. Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004.
_____. ”The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 27 (1975):
85-99.
_____. The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Study of Control. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.
Wellum, Stephen J. "Divine Sovereignty-Omniscience, Inerrancy, and Open Theism: An
Evaluation." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45, no. 2 (2002): 257- 277.
Wiggins, David. “Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism.” In Honderich, 1973.
Wright, R. K. McGregor. No Place for Sovereignty: What's Wrong with Freewill Theism?
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996.
Wykstra, Stephen J. “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On
Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
16, no. 2 (1984): 73-93.

108

